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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact of acquisition reform initiatives implemented 
since 1993 on contract cost performance.  Many initiatives implemented during the 1990s 
focused on saving the government money in procuring weapon systems.  For decades, 
cost overruns have plagued Department of Defense weapons systems development and 
procurement costing the government money.  The passage of the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996, marked 
significant congressional action on aiding the Department of Defense develop and 
procure systems cheaper.  Conclusions drawn in this thesis may aid leadership in 
supporting current initiatives and drafting new changes. 
This research effort studied 204 contracts completed between January 1, 1994 and 
December 31, 2001.  It was discovered that cost performance for contracts completed 
after reform initiative implementation was no different than cost performance on 
contracts completed before implementation.  The research also analyzed cost 
performance on all active contracts from 1970 to 2002 against the backdrop of 
acquisition reform studies and commissions over the same time period, to examine any 
trends or time lags between reform implementation and contract cost performance 
change.  The results indicate some evidence of cost performance change following the 
different studies and commissions.  Possible explanations and implications of these 
results, and suggestions for future research are provided. 
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AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ACQUISITION REFORM 
INITIATIVES AND CONTRACT COST VARIANCE 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
We must do more with less. 
  - The list is long 
  
General Issue  
The decade of the 1990s was a period of change for the United States military, 
both operationally and budgetary.  The end of the Cold War and the success of Operation 
Desert Storm resulted in increased operations tempo, a personnel reduction of 34%, and a 
budget reduction of 40% (Cordesman, 1999: 2-3; CBO, 2000: 1-2).  The “Do More With 
Less” adage was born and became a common statement among Department of Defense 
(DoD) leadership.  
The Clinton Administration’s first term faced these issues head on.  The military’s 
worldwide tasking and deployments increased as overseas bases were closed and 
remaining bases faced aging facilities and infrastructure in need of repair, all requiring 
additional funds (CBO, 2000: 1-2).   At the same time, the DoD continued to develop and 
procure new weapon systems and modifications to existing weapon systems, which were 
more technologically advanced and more expensive than legacy systems (Goure, 2000: 
1).  To make the federal budget pieces fit, funding for national defense decreased in order 
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to keep day-to-day operations running (see Figure 1).  In fact, procurement spending 
declined by 59% between fiscal years 1987 to 1997 (CRS Report, 2001: CRS-2).   
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Figure 1.  DoD Budget Authority (DoD FY03 Budget Greenbook: 114-115) 
In order to continue some level of modernization, the acquisition and procurement 
process within the federal government, and more specifically, within the DoD required 
change.  Acquisition Reform, as we know it today, was reintroduced in an effort to 
procure weapon systems better, faster and cheaper (CRS Report, 2001: CRS-2). 
Specific Issue  
The defense acquisition system experienced “reform” movements in the 1970s 
and the 1980s.  Despite reform focused on reducing costs, research shows that weapon 
system programs continued to overrun cost and schedule constraints (Searle, 1997).  In 
fact, a 1993 RAND study indicated that cost growth of DoD programs since the mid 
1960s fluctuated around 20 percent (Drezner and others, 1993:20).  The last three DoD 
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Acquisition chiefs lauded the current Acquisition Reform movement successful.  
However, some are not so optimistic and pleased with the results.  In April 2000, before 
the Senate Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee, Senator Carl Levin 
stated that many contracts have failed to use or have overused the increased flexibility 
provided by Acquisition Reform and therefore, have not realized cost reductions.  Current 
research on this subject is optimistic and indicates that contract cost performance woes 
are on the rebound and that Acquisition Reform initiatives are in fact reducing the cost of 
buying new weapon systems (Christensen and Templin, 2002). 
Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study focuses on the timeline of current reform initiative implementation, 
with an emphasis on cost reduction-focused initiatives.  This study assesses if DoD 
weapon system contract cost performance is improving or not and how any cost 
performance trends (positive or negative) relate to the implementation timeline.  The 
Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) database will be analyzed to perform 
the program cost performance assessment.   
There are two limitations in this study important to note.  First, based on prior and 
current research, the analysis assumes that Acquisition Reform initiatives prior to the 
Clinton Administration had no positive effect on the contract cost performance and 
therefore, any changes in performance are a result of the current reform movement.  
Second, because only seven years have passed since the current Acquisition Reform 
movement started, the full impact and success cannot be assessed in this study.     
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Research Objectives 
This research study has two main objectives.  First, to determine if a mapping 
between cost initiatives and cost growth improvement exists and if so, what is the time 
period between implementation of an initiative and the results.  Based on this 
relationship, the focus will be on developing a model or “rule of thumb” to estimate or 
forecast an impact window or time frame in which to expect results for future cost-related 
Acquisition Reform policies.  The end goals are to provide some evidence to DoD 
leadership that Acquisition Reform is positively affecting contract cost performance and 
to provide evidence that it takes time for such initiatives to bear fruit.  Successful 
accomplishment of these goals would allow DoD to use this evidence in the future when 
implementing, supporting and justifying new changes to the Acquisition process and 
assessing associated results. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the analysis is broken into phases.  Phase One 
will analyze and compare contract cost performance for pre- and post-reform periods to 
see if there are indications that acquisition reform initiatives are having an impact, either 
positive or negative.  Phase Two will look at contract cost performance over time to see if 
there is a “rule of thumb” relationship between acquisition reform initiatives and cost 
performance improvement.  Dependent upon the results of Phase One and Phase Two, a 
third phase of analysis will be conducted with different pre- and post-reform periods used 
to see if there are indications of cost performance impact. 
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Organization of the Study 
This chapter established the motivation for analyzing the topic and the research 
objectives.  Chapter 2 describes past and present Acquisition Reform efforts, describes 
Earned Value Management and provides details on past research in this subject area.  
Chapter 3 details the methodology used to analyze the cost performance and rule of 
thumb development and Chapter 4 provides the results of the analysis.  Finally, Chapter 5 
provides conclusions from the study and recommendations for further research.  
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II.  Literature Review 
 
DoD has achieved a large measure of success with Acquisition Reform. 
  - Honorable Paul G. Kaminski, USD(A&T) 
   26 February 1997 
 
Real reform in our acquisition of weapons and major systems has taken place in  
recent years. 
 - Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, USD(A&T) 
Testimony before Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology of the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, 18 March 1998 
 
These reform initiatives are so obligatory with each change at the helm that they can 
bring a “same package, different name” quality with them.  It’s a shame-but not a 
surprise-that so much cynicism has grown around such a worthy word as reform. 
 - Honorable E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, USD(AT&L) 
  30 April 2002 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a brief overview, historical and current, of Acquisition 
Reform efforts, a description of the Earned Value Management system utilized to assess 
Department of Defense (DoD) program cost performance, and a review of past research 
conducted in analyzing Acquisition Reform and DoD contract cost performance.   
Acquisition Reform 
 The historical overview starts with Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard’s 
changes in the 1970s and concludes with the 1989 Defense Management Report.  The 
current reform overview begins with the National Performance Review (NPR) and 
concludes with a focus on initiatives that affect cost performance and cost control.     
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Historical Acquisition Reform Overview (1970’s – 1992) 
Table 1 lists several defense acquisition studies conducted from the 1960s through 
the 1980s.  This historical reform overview will focus on those highlighted, as these are 
the major acquisition studies orchestrated by the Executive Branch. 
Table 1.  Significant Defense Acquisition Studies (Jones, 1996:405) 
Report by Issued
Peck & Scherer (Harvard Business School) 1962, 1964
Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (Fitzhugh Commission) 1970
Commission on Government Procurement 1972
J. Ronald Fox (Harvard Business School) 1974
Military Services and Secretary of Defense 1974-75
Defense Science Board Summer Study (Acquisition Cycle Task Force) 1977
Defense Resources Board 1977
DoD Resource Management Study 1979
Jacques S. Gansler 1980
Acquisition Improvement Task Force (Carlucci Initiatives) 1981
Special Panel on Defense Procurement Procedures 1982
Grace Commission 1983
Special Task Force on Selected Defense Procurement Matters 1984
Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies 1985
Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (Packard Commission) 1986
Defense Management Review 1989  
Packard 
The Vietnam War and rising weapon system procurement costs created a Defense 
Department spending draw down (Jones, 1999: 402).   Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird 
and his Deputy, David Packard, realized the need for better control over the acquisition 
process (Ferrara, 1996:110).  In 1969, Secretary Packard returned the authority for the 
acquisition process to the military services and created the Defense Systems Acquisition 
Review Council (DSARC) to act as the advisory group to the Defense Secretary (Ferrara, 
1996:111; Jones, 1999:402). With the creation of the DSARC, Secretary Packard 
established milestones and phases to monitor and assess program status and to streamline 
the acquisition process (Jones, 1999:403).   
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In May 1970, Secretary Packard issued a memorandum listing broad themes such 
as decentralized execution, streamlined management structures and use of appropriate 
contract mechanisms (Ferrara, 1996:111).  This memorandum would become the 
foundation for DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, completed in July 1971 (Ferrara, 
1996:111).  Secretary Packard’s vision was the following: 
 Successful development, production, and deployment of major defense systems 
are primarily dependent upon competent people, rational priorities, and clearly 
defined responsibilities.  Responsibility and authority for the acquisition of major 
defense systems shall be decentralized to the maximum practicable extent 
consistent with the urgency and importance of each program. 
 
 The development and production of a major defense system shall be managed by 
a single individual (program manager) who shall have a charter that provides 
sufficient authority to accomplish recognized program objectives.  Layers of 
authority between program manager and his Component Head shall be 
minimum…[the] assignment and tenure of program managers shall be a matter of 
concern to DoD Component Heads and shall reflect career incentives designed to 
attract, retain, and reward competent personnel (Ferrara, 1996:111). 
 
The final section of DoDD 5000.1 contained the following guidance: 
• Wherever feasible, operational needs shall be satisfied through the use of 
existing military or commercial hardware; 
 
• Practical tradeoffs shall be made between system capability, cost, and 
schedule; 
 
• Logistic support shall be considered as a principal design parameter; 
 
• Schedules shall be structured to avoid unnecessary overlapping or 
concurrency; 
 
• Test and evaluation shall commence as early as possible; 
 
• Contract type shall be consistent with all program characteristics, including 
risk; 
 
• Source selection decisions shall take into account the contractor’s capability; 
 
• Develop a necessary defense system on a timely and cost-effective basis; and 
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• Documentation shall be generated in the minimum amount to satisfy 
necessary and specific management needs. 
 
Packard’s early ideology established acquisition reforms that DoD still operates under 
today.  Packard’s vision would be reflected in the studies that followed over the next 30 
years. 
Carlucci Initiatives 
 The Acquisition Improvement Task Force, also known as the Defense Acquisition 
Improvement Program or the Carlucci Initiatives, was directed by Secretary of Defense 
Casper Weinberger in 1981 to look at all aspects of defense acquisition (Ferrara, 
1996:118; Jones, 1999:406).  The “Reagan buildup” of the 1980s required reductions in 
weapon system costs and development durations (Jones, 1999:406).  Led by Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, the task force resulted in 32 initiatives (Table 2) to 
improve the acquisition process.  However, due to a lack of acceptance from Congress 
and industry, coupled with rumors of fraud, waste and abuse, most of the 32 initiatives 
were never implemented (Gregory, 1989:60).  Initiatives that survived addressed multi-
year procurement and fixed-price contracts, greater competition, stabilized programs and 
realistic budgeting (Jones, 1999:406).  These initiatives made their way into the 
acquisition process with the 1982 revision of DoDD 5000.1, as evidenced by this excerpt 
from the 1982 version: 
 Improved readiness and sustainability are primary objectives of the acquisition 
process…. Reasonable stability in acquisition programs is necessary to carry out 
effective, efficient, and timely acquisitions.  To achieve stability, DoD 
Components shall conduct effective evolutionary alternatives, estimate and 
budget realistically, [and] plan to achieve economical rates of production (Ferrara, 
1996:119). 
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Table 2.  Carlucci Initiatives (Adams, 1984, 15) 
1. Reaffirm Acquisition Management Principles 17. Decrease DSARC Briefing and Data Requirements
2. Increase Use of Preplanned Product 18. Budget for Inflation
          Improvement 19. Forecast Business Base Conditions
3. Implement Multiyear Procurement 20. Improve Source Selection Process
4. Increase Program Stability 21. Develop and Use Standard Operation and 
5. Encourage Capital Investment to Enhance           Support Systems
          Productivity 22. Provide More Appropriate Design-to-Cost Goals
6. Budget to Most Likely Costs 23. Implement Acquisition Process Decisions
7. Use Economical Production Rates 24. Reduce DSARC Milestones
8. Assure Appropriate Contract Type 25. Submit MENS (later JMSNS) with Service POM
9. Improve System Support and Readiness 26. Revise DSARC Membership
10. Reduce Administrative Costs and Time 27. Retain USDR&E as Defense Acquisition 
11. Budget for Technological Risk           Executive
12. Provide Front-end Funding for Test Hardware 28. Raise Dollar Threshold for DSARC Review
13. Reduce Governmental Legislation Related 29. Integrate DSARC and PPBS Process
          Acquisition 30. Increase PM Visibility of Support Resources
14. Reduce number of DoD Directives 31. Improve Reliability and Support
15. Enhance Funding Flexibility 32. Increase Competition
16. Provide Contractor Incentives to Improve 33. Enhance the Defense Industrial Base 
          Reliability           (added 1984)
 
 The General Accounting Office (GAO) completed a final report analyzing the 
Carlucci Initiatives in July 1986 (Munechika, 1997:8).  The GAO concluded, “top level 
commitment to change did no t filter down to the program manager level” and that the 
“commitment to the improvement program ha[d] dissipated” (GAO, 1986:2; Munechika, 
1997:8).  In fact, after only five years implementing the Carlucci Initiatives, the DoD was 
moving forward with the plan of monitoring results of the initiatives, resulting in the lack 
of success (Munechika, 1997:9). 
Grace Commission 
On June 30, 1982, President Reagan established the President’s Private Sector 
Survey on Cost Control (PPSSCC) under the guidance of J. Peter Grace, to identify 
opportunities for better efficiency and reduced costs that could result from any form of 
executive or legislative action (US Congress, 1984:2).  This survey group was recognized 
as the Grace Commission.  The Grace Commission consisted of 161 chief executive 
   
11 
officers of major corporations and private sector experts, and totaled more than 2,000 
total participants (US Congress, 1984:3).   
The Grace Commission submitted 2,478 recommendations to the President on 
reforms for the government (US Congress, 1984:24).  Only 112 of the 2,478 pertained to 
DoD operations, and 21 of the 112 involved changes to the acquisition process (US 
Congress, 1984).  The major recommendations are listed below in Table 3. 
Table 3.  Grace Commission Recommendations (House Armed Services Committee, 
1985:3) 
1. Greater use of multiyear contracting to improve program stability
2. Prioritize all weapons systems
3. Streamline and strengthen the contract selection process
4. Upgrade cost estimating
5. Enhance the role, responsibility, authority and accountability of the PM
6. Increase the use of dual sources, throughout the life of the program
7. Increase emphasis on the Spare Parts Breakout Program to identify and obtain spare parts
    from sources other than the Prime Contractor
8. Consolidate responsibility for contract administration activity at the level of OSD
9. Simplify/streamline the 30,000 pages of regulation related to Defense procurement
10. Mandate use of common components, subsystems and equipment by all services
11. Eliminate the use of unnecessary military specifications
12. Outsource commercial functions
13. Incentivize government employees
 
The only shortfall with the Grace Commission was that the recommendations 
came shortly after the Carlucci Initiatives were published.  The DoD believed they 
addressed the Commission recommendations by instituting the Carlucci Initiatives 
(Munechika, 1997:12).  Therefore, the Grace Commission recommendations for 
acquisition reform eventually faded away much like many of the Carlucci Initiatives 
(Munechika, 1997:12). 
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Packard Commission 
On July 15, 1985, responding to continued stories of acquisition problems and 
contractor overcharging, President Reagan initiated the Blue Ribbon Commission on 
Defense Management, chaired by former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard 
(Munechika, 1997:12; Jones, 1999:407).  The Packard Commission focused on broad 
organizational changes and would become the Reagan Administration’s most recognized 
acquisition reform movement (Jones, 1999:407).  The Commission’s charter was to 
review and make recommendations in the following areas: 
• Adequacy of the defense acquisition process, industrial base and current law 
and regulations; 
 
• Adequacy of current authority and control of Secretary of Defense; 
 
• Responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 
 
• Adequacy of the Unified and Specified Command system in providing 
effective planning and use of forces; 
 
• Value and continued role of intervening layers of command on military 
forces; 
 
• Procedures for developing and fielding military systems incorporating new 
technologies in a timely fashion; 
 
• Congressional oversight and investigative procedures relating to the DoD; 
 
• Recommend how to improve the effectiveness and stability of resources 
allocation for defense (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1996:27-28). 
 
The Commission examined how to make the military acquisition system more efficient 
like commercial organizations (Munechika, 1997:13).  By June 1986, less than one year 
from organizing, the Commission submitted the final report.  Table 4 shows the Packard 
Commission’s Formula for Action to make the process more efficient. 
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Table 4.  Packard Commission’s Formula for Action 
A. Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures
      1. Create new Under Secretary of Defense for Acqusition position
      2. Each service should establish a comparable Service Acquisition Executive (SAE)
      3. Each SAE should appoint Program Executive Officers (PEO)
      4. Program managers report directly to PEOs
      5. Substantially reduce the number of acquisition personnel
      6. Recodify federal laws into a single, greatly simplified statute
B. Use Technology to Reduce Cost
      1. Emphasize building and testing prototypes to demonstrate new technology
      2. Operational testing should begin early in development
      3. Prototypes can provide a basis for improved cost estimating
C. Balance Cost and Performance
      1. Restructure Joint Requirements and Management Board leadership
      2. Joint Requirements Management Board should define weapon requirements and provide 
           tradeoff between cost and performance
D. Stabilize Programs
      1. Baseline programs and use multi-year funding
E. Expand the Use of Commercial Products
      1. Do not rely on military specifications
      2. Use off-the-shelf products as much as possible
F. Increase the Use of Competition
      1. Focus on more effective competition, modeled on commercial practices
      2. Emphasize quality and past performance as well as price
G. Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel
       1. Allow Secretary of Defense to establish flexible personnel management practices
       2. Recommend new personnel management system for acquisition personnel, 
        contracting officers and scientists and engineers  
On April 2, 1986, President Reagan signed a directive to implement the Packard 
Commission’s recommendations (Blue Ribbon Commission, 1996:33).  The Packard 
Commission laid the groundwork for the passing of both the Goldwater-Nichols Act and 
the Defense Acquisition Improvement Act of 1986; both contained sweeping changes to 
the acquisition process and overall DoD management (Munechika, 1997:15).  Also, the 
applicable Packard Commission recommendations were written into a new version of the 
DoDD 5000.1; specifically the new chain of authority (Ferrara, 1996:120).  
By 1990, the progress reports on the Packard Commission recommendations were 
positive.  Particular emphasis had been placed on program stability and cost control 
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(Munechika, 1997:15).  The same report noted that only the enhancement of the DoD 
acquisition personnel portion of the Formula for Action was not a success story 
(Munechika, 1997:15).  The Bush Administration would take an aggressive look at this 
“success” upon taking office in 1989. 
Defense Management Report 
Upon taking office in 1989, President Bush requested a National Security Review 
with the goal of developing a plan to fully implement the Packard Commission 
recommendations, further improve the defense acquisition system, and better manage the 
DoD (Cheney, 1989:i).  The Defense Management Report (DMR) was completed in July 
1989.  The DMR took an analytical view of the DoD based on the Packard Commission 
recommendations and assessed how far along the department was in implementation and 
most importantly, what remained to be accomplished.  Secretary of Defense Cheney 
noted that to realize President Bush’s objectives for improving the acquisition process, 
the following would need to occur: 
• Teamwork among DoD’s senior managers; 
 
• Sound, longer-range planning and better means for managing available 
resources; 
 
• More discipline in what weapon systems we buy and how we buy them; 
 
• Better management of the people we rely on to produce such systems; 
 
• An environment that promotes steady progress in cutting costs and increasing 
quality and productivity; and 
 
• Adherence to the highest ethical standards (Cheney, 1989:27).   
 
Notable improvements included chartering the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC) to enhance the requirements generation and weapon system validation; 
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establishing an Acquisition Corps and improving professional education and training; 
strengthening the role of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition; and 
consolidating the contract administration functions under a single organization - the 
Defense Logistics Agency (Munechika, 1997:16; Jones, 1999:404).  The DMR concluded 
with a vitally important point; actions will take time, effort, consensus and commitment 
(Cheney, 1989:27). 
By the end of 1991, major steps in implementing many of Secretary Cheney’s 
recommendations had occurred.  The Defense Contract Management Command (now 
Agency) was created under the Defense Logistics Agency, consisting of a reduction to 
five district offices and manpower reductions in all offices (Munechika, 1997:16).  To 
address the discipline issues, the DoDD 5000 series was expanded significantly.  The 
new series contained clear guidelines with an attempt to streamline the regulation regime 
by consolidating all previous directives, instructions and policy memoranda (Ferrara, 
1996:121; Munechika, 1997:17).  As a result, the new series contained over 900 pages 
and was more than 15 times larger than any previous version. 
Summary 
This section provided a brief overview of some of the major acquisition reform 
initiatives between 1970 and 1992.  From a historical point of view, it is evident that 
while the reform studies and commissions have changed names, many of the ideas and 
recommendations remained the same between Packard (1970), Carlucci (1981), Grace 
(1983), Packard (1986) and the Defense Management Report (1989). 
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Current Acquisition Reform Overview (1993 – Today) 
This section defines the current acquisition reform period as the reform initiatives 
that began with the Clinton Administration, specifically the National Performance 
Review, led by Vice President Gore.  This section focuses on the National Perfo rmance 
Review (NPR) conclusions, the resulting legislative changes, and concludes with a 
synopsis of reform initiatives that have had a direct focus on cost control. 
National Performance Review 
The National Performance Review (NPR) was a similar review to what the Grace 
Commission accomplished 10 years prior, in that it performed a detailed look at all 
government activities to find areas for improvement.  The first report was released on      
7 September 1993 (Munechika, 1997:31).  This report contained 384 recommendations 
that spanned all facets of government operations, including federal procurement 
(Munechika, 1997:31).  The NPR pointed out that in the DoD, there were at least 889 
laws affecting procurement, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) was over 1,600 
pages, and was further supplemented with over 2,900 pages of agency-specific 
procurement regulations (Reinventing Federal Procurement, 1993:5).  Table 5 gives a 
brief layout of the recommendations for procurement reform that came out of the NPR.   
Analyzing the list, it is easy to discern similarities between prior commission 
recommendations and issues identified by the NPR.  In 1995, the NPR reconvened and 
accomplished a second assessment to look for any governmental functions that could be 
terminated, privatized or restructured (National Partnership for Reinventing Government, 
1999).  The actual savings suggested by the NPR are contested between what the Clinton 
Administration estimated versus what the General Accounting Office (GAO) and other 
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private groups could estimate.  For the purposes of this report, the true savings are not 
important.  The importance of the NPR is that it reinvigorated the Acquisition Reform 
movement in the DoD (Munechika, 1997:31). 
Table 5.  National Performance Review Procurement Reform Recommendations 
(Reinventing Federal Procurement, 1993) 
PROC01 Reframe Acquisition Policy
     - Reduce rules and regulations
PROC02 Build an Innovative Procurement Workforce
      - Better education and training
PROC03 Encourage More Procurement Innovation
     - Test new methods with pilot programs
PROC04 Establish New Simplified Acquisition Threshold and Procedures
     - Low cost procedures for small purchases
PROC06 Amend Protest Rules
     - Increased communication between buyers and sellers
PROC08 Reform Information Technology Procurement
     - Decrease time to purchase computer equipment
PROC09 Lower Costs and Reduce Bureaucracy in Small Purchases 
Through the Use of Purchase Cards
     - IMPAC Card use
PROC13 Foster Reliance on the Commercial Marketplace
     - Reduce reliance on government-specific specifications
PROC15 Encourage Best Value Procurement
     - Lowest bidder is not always best!
PROC16 Promote Excellence in Vendor Performance
     - Use past performance in contract award decisions
PROC18 Authorize multiyear contracts
PROC19 Conform Certain Statutory Requirements for Civilian Agencies
to Those of Defense Agencies
     - Raise minimums for cost and pricing data certification  
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
The FASA of 1994 incorporated much of Vice President Gore’s NPR 
recommendations for creating a “government that works better and costs less” (FASA 
DSMC, 2002).  The intent was to overhaul the cumbersome and complex procurement 
system of the federal government and, more importantly, the DoD (FASA DSMC, 2002).  
Table 6 highlights some of the changes included in the FASA of 1994. 
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Table 6.  Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA DSMC, 2002) 
- Eliminated paperwork and record keeping requirements
- Allowed direct micropurchases
- Exempted commercial purchases from cost and pricing data
     and cost accounting standards
- Reserved small dollar acquisitions for small businesses
- Improved bid protest and contract administration procedures
- Required evaluation of past performance before contract award
- Raised Truth in Negotiation Act threshold for required cost and
     pricing data  
The result of the new law caused a ripple in the federal and defense regulations 
related to acquisition and program management.  In fact, the new reform push started 
before passage of the law.  In June 1993, Colleen Preston was appointed as the Deputy 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform [DUSD(AR)] (Munechika, 1997:31).  
In 1995, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD[AT&L]), 
Paul Kaminski called for the revision of the DoD 5000 series to incorporate the new 
flexibility and streamlined practices created by the FASA of 1994 (DoD Directive 5000 
Series rewrite DSMC, 2002).  In fact, the FASA required that all federal regulation 
change proposals be published not later than 210 days after the law was enacted 
(GAO/NSIAD-96-139:1).   
Title V of the FASA of 1994 contained provisions for performance-based 
acquisition management designed to foster the development of 1) measurable cost, 
schedule, and performance goals, and 2) incentives for acquisition personnel to reach 
these goals (GAO/NSIAD-97-22BR:1).  At the time of the GAO’s report, the DoD had 
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complied with the applicable part of Title V (part 1) by Fiscal Year 1995 (GAO/NSIAD-
97-22BR:2).   
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 
In 1996, Congress enacted the Information Technology Management Reform Act 
and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (Clinger-Cohen DSMC, 2002).  These two acts 
together are better known today as the Clinger-Cohen Act.  A quote by Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Paul Kaminski, summarizes what the act 
accomplished: 
The Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (formerly known as the Federal 
Acquis ition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA) and the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act of 1996 (ITMRA)) further advance the changes 
made by FASA.  The Clinger-Cohen Act provides a number of significant 
opportunities for DoD to further streamline and reduce non-value added 
steps in the acquisition process.  Among the most significant changes 
authorized by the Act is a test of the use of the Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures (SAP) for commercial items between the simplified acquisition 
threshold of $100,000 and $5 million.  This should allow DoD to reduce 
its administrative costs and overhead costs for DoD’s vendor base for 
purchases of relatively low risk items.  This change eliminated 
government-unique requirements previously cited by industry as a barrier 
to doing business with DoD.  The Act also provides the authority for 
contracting activities to use SAPs for all requirements between $50,000 
and the SAP while the government works to fully implement Electronic 
Commerce/Electronic Data Interchange (EC/EDI). (C linger-Cohen 
DSMC, 2002) 
 
Important to the analysis of cost growth, and more specifically cost variance, is 
that the Act provided some relief from cumbersome and non-value added processes that 
increased costs of programs (Clinger-Cohen DSMC, 2002).  Additionally, the Clinger-
Cohen Act established statutory standards for acquisition personnel and required each 
federal agency involved in procurement to budget funds specifically for education and 
training (AFMC Acquisition Reform Guide, 1999:5).   This was a key step forward.  
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Personnel would not be able to utilize the new flexibility and concepts unless they were 
trained and educated first. 
Summary 
Current period reform initiatives are not conceptually different from ideas 
presented in the previous section.  The major difference was the direct involvement of 
Congress in mandating changes in procedures and regulations to provide increased 
flexibility.  The enactment of the FASA of 1994 implemented much of the NPR 
recommendations.  The enactment of Clinger-Cohen of 1996 (FASA II) further enhanced 
the groundwork established two years earlier.  The next section provides additional detail 
for specific changes implemented by the DoD to take advantage of the new flexibility and 
attempt to make headway into controlling, and ultimately reducing, the cost of defense 
procurement. 
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Review of Implemented Initiatives 
Integrated Product and Process Development 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) is a concept used by private 
industry since the early 1980s and now “borrowed” by the DoD (DoD Guide to IPPD, 
1996:1-2).  At the core of IPPD implementation is the use of Integrated Product Teams 
(IPTs) (DoD Guide to IPPD, 1996:ix).  Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of 
the IPPD process.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Generic IPPD Iterative Process (DoD Guide to IPPD, 1996). 
IPPD is defined as the following: 
A management process that integrates all activities from product concept 
through production/field support, using a multi- functional team to 
simultaneously optimize the product and its manufacturing and 
sustainment processes to meet cost and performance objectives. (DoD 
Guide to IPPD, 1996:1-3) 
 
Proper implementation of the IPPD process requires an understanding of the key 
tenets.  The tenets are self-explanatory from their titles and are listed in Table 7. 
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Table 7.  Key Tenets of IPPD (DoD Guide to IPPD, 1996:1-7 – 1-8) 
1. Customer Focus 
2. Concurrent Development of Products and Processes 
3. Early and Continuous Life Cycle Planning 
4. Maximize Flexibility for Optimization and Use of Contractor Approaches
5. Encourage Robust Design and Improved Process Capability
6. Event-Driven Scheduling
7. Multidisciplinary Teamwork
8. Empowerment
9. Seamless Management Tools
10. Proactive Identification and Management of Risk  
A 28 April 1995 memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Paul Kaminski and a 10 May 1995 memorandum 
from the Secretary of Defense William Perry officially initiated the DoD’s push for IPPD 
development and use (Ferrara and Johnson, 1995:4). 
The DoD leadership objectives for IPT are contained in Table 8.  Under Secretary 
of Defense Kaminski pointed out that the use of teams “allows for early-on and 
continuous insight by all stakeholders in a program” (FAR Rewrite DSMC, 2002).   
Table 8.  DoD IPT Objectives (Ferrara and Johnson, 1995:2) 
- Creation of an acqusition system that capitalizes on the strengths of all participants 
     in the acquisition process to develop programs with the highest opportunity for success.
- Fostering the early and active participation of OSD and Component staff organizations with
     program office teams to develop a sound and executable acquisition strategy, and identify
     and resolve issues as they arise, not during the final decision meeting.
- Transforming historically adversarial relationships, especially between headquarters staff
     organizations and program office teams, into productive partnerships.
- Placing renewed emphasis on the importance of working as cross-functional teams to 
     maximize overall performance.
 
In 1993, Wagner and White investigated the F-22 System Program Office (SPO) 
to see how they were utilizing IPPD and IPTs.  Lessons learned consisted of the 
realization that properly organized and implemented teams were effective and that each 
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organization must tailor their teams to the respective organization or product/processes 
involved (Wagner and White, 1993:5-5).  The researchers also noted that communication 
was key to making the process flow smoothly (Wagner and White, 1993:5-6).   
Cost as an Independent Variable  
Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) is the DoD’s acquisition methodology 
for making technical and schedule performance a function of available budget resources 
(Koreisha and LaPlaca-Mars, 1997).  This initiative drives decision makers to consider 
trading performance away to reduce or maintain cost (CRS Report, 2001:CRS-6).  In 
December 1994, the Defense Manufacturing Council (DMC), headed by the Principal 
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, met to formulate 
action plans to implement CAIV into the acquisition culture (Focused Approach, 
1995:49).  The action plan for CAIV implementation is presented in Table 9. 
Table 9.  CAIV Implementation Action Plan (Focused Approach, 1995:51) 
 - Develop a DoD integrated team approach (process) to establish mission needs, tradeoffs 
         and cost goals
 - Establish a joint Service Acquisition Executive IPT under the auspices of the DMC
 - Start the process of changing "values" (within DoD)
 - Make unit cost objectives and cost/performance tradeoffs a major topic of each Defense
         Acquisition Board meeting
 - Establish budget and resource planning and analysis procedures compatible with
         cost/performance tradeoffs as a main acquisition management approach  
CAIV strategy entails setting aggressive, realistic cost objectives for acquiring 
defense systems, and managing risks to obtain those objectives (CAIV Working Group 
Report, 1995:1).  CAIV is made possible through the increased flexibility introduced by 
both the FASA of 1994 and the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  A key element to making 
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CAIV successful is proper motivation of industry, achieved through competition and 
contract incentives (CAIV Working Group Report, 1995:7).  Competition includes 
making life-cycle costs a factor in source selection versus the previous way of looking at 
only near term costs (CAIV Working Group Report, 1995:7).  When competition 
between multiple vendors is not possible, contract incentives can be used to provide 
profit motivation for contractors to reduce costs (CAIV Working Group Report, 1995:7). 
The first edition (published in 1996) of DoDD 5000.2R to include CAIV related concepts 
required each acquisition program to provide incentives to contractors to meet or exceed 
cost objectives (Gaddis, 1998:35). 
Single Process Initiative 
In December 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry and Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition and Technology, Paul Kaminski, introduced the Single Process 
Initiative (SPI) (Kaminski, 1997:11).  The intent of the SPI was to allow contractors to 
utilize the same practices and procedures while performing government work as they 
would while performing commercial work.  The requirement to segregate commercial 
and defense related efforts for similar products adds costs to the end product through 
increased company overhead costs (Perry, 1994:4).  In other words, more processes for 
the contractor equates to more cost to the government. 
The end objectives of implementing the SPI were: 1) save money, 2) obtain a 
better product, and 3) foster a more competitive industry (Kaminski, 1997:11).  SPI 
forced contractors to consolidate or eliminate multiple processes, specifications, and 
standards for a product whether it was for commercial or defense (CRS Report, 
2001:CRS-6).  SPI implementation has allowed greater civil/military integration and 
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paved the way for greater emphasis on using commercial specifications instead of rigid 
and expensive military specifications (Gansler, 1998).  The early success of SPI is 
indicated in the following quote: 
One of the benchmarks of success in our acquisition reform effort is the 
speed with which we can implement specific cost saving initiatives.  This 
is one of the major contributions of the Single Process Initiative.  It has 
been a huge success in paving the way for the Department’s conversion to 
commercial practices, while already saving almost $500 million in costs. 
                                  - Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, USD(AT&L) 
                                    29 September 1998, SPI Recognition Awards Ceremony 
Earned Value Management  
Earned Value Management (EVM) is “a tool that allows both government and 
contractor program managers to have visibility into technical, cost, and schedule progress 
on their contracts” (DoD EVM Guide, 1997:2).  Beginning with the Navy’s Polaris 
program, the DoD made EVM use policy in 1967 (Abba, 1995:1).  At this point, the tool 
was known as Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC).  The 35 criteria were 
adopted from private industry best practices and provided a contractor with minimum 
requirements for their management control systems (Abba, 1995:1).  During the 1970s 
and 1980s the C/SCSC continued to become burdensome and became viewed as 
“compulsory financial reporting requirements as opposed to valuable and fundamental 
management tools” (Abba, 1995:1). 
In 1989, the C/SCSC policy transferred from the control of the DoD Comptroller 
to the control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (Abba, 1995:1).  
However, it took longer for DoD managers to change their attitudes regarding the “value” 
of C/SCSC.  Following “a series of management disasters”, including the Navy’s A-12 
program, DoD began to view EVM as a vital management control tool (Abba, 1995:2).  
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The early to mid-1990s saw many refinements to the requirements and to the 
implementation practices.  This created increased acceptance and use of EVM by 
government, industry and foreign countries (Abba, 1995:2).  “Earned value, adapted by 
DoD nearly 30 years ago from industrial practices, is being readapted to meet 
management needs in today’s high-tech commercial world” (Abba, 1995:3). 
Concepts and Criteria 
Program managers and other senior decision makers need insight into how their 
acquisition programs are performing, both from a schedule and cost perspective.  Use of 
an EVM system provides managers with this data which: 
• Relate time-phased budgets to specific contract tasks and/or statements of 
work; 
 
• Indicate work progress; 
 
• Properly relate cost, schedule and technical accomplishment 
 
• Are valid, timely and auditable; 
 
• Supply managers with information at a practical level of summarization; and 
 
• Are derived from the same internal earned value management systems used by 
the contractor to manage the contract (DoD EVM Guide, 1997:2). 
 
The main premise behind use of the EVM tool is to tailor the system to properly “match” 
the using organization, the products, and working relationships involved in the program.  
The criteria are general enough to allow for proper tailoring for different contractors, 
different contract types, and different projects (DoD EVM Guide, 1997:2).  The 
“generality” provides contractors flexibility to develop a system that is best suited to their 
management needs (DoD EVM Guide, 1997:3).  The criteria are utilized to assess 
whether a contractor has an acceptable EVM system (DoD EVM Guide, 1997:5).   
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What Do EVM Systems Really Do? 
At a fundamental level, EVM establishes a structure for management to complete 
the steps in Table 10.  
Table 10.  Brief Summary of EVM Criteria (DoD EVM Guide, 1997:5-8) 
1. Organization
    - Define the work to be performed
    - Establish the program structure which provides for integration
      of planning, scheduling, budgeting, and control
2. Planning and Budgeting
    - Schedule the work
    - Identify milestones, goal points and other means to measure progress
    - Break work into work packages and establish budgets for work segments
3. Accounting Considerations
    - Record costs in a formal system
    - Track control account budgets to organizational elements 
4. Analysis and Management Reports
    - Monthly report of schedule and cost variance
    - Provide detailed explanations for significant variances
    - Complete revised estimates resulting from performance to date
5. Revisions and Data Maintenance
    - Incorporate authorized changes timely (budget and schedule)
    - Prevent unauthorized changes
    - Document changes to the performance measurement baseline  
Important to this study is the understanding of how EVM tracks work, in terms of 
schedule and budget, and how schedule and cost variances are computed.  Figure 3 
defines different acronyms used in the EVMS to assess schedule and cost performance. 
Figure 4 provides a visual depiction how cost and schedule variances are 
computed for the analysis and management reports part of EVM.  This study focuses on 
the cost variances for DoD weapons system acquisition programs. 
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Figure 3.  EVM Terminology (Haupt, 2002) 
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• Schedule Variance            SV   =  BCWP – BCWS
• Cost Variance                     CV   =  BCWP – ACWP 
VARIANCES (Favorable is positive, Unfavorable is negative)
CV % = CV BCWP
SV % = SV BCWS
• Variance at Completion VAC   =  BAC – EAC
BAC
 
Figure 4.  EVM Variance Analysis (DSMC Gold Card, 2000). 
The complete DSMC Gold Card can be found in Appendix A.  The Gold Card provides 
detail on what makes up the Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) and a pictorial 
view of how work is broken into work and planning packages.  It is important to note that 
BCWP = BCWS at the end of a contract.  For this reason, the focus of this analysis is 
solely on cost variance.  
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From Figure 4, it becomes apparent why EVM is such a valuable tool to the 
program manager.  At any point in time, a program can be assessed as to how complete 
the program is and how the program is spending budgetary resources compared to the 
plan. 
Summary 
This section provided detail as to how EVM came to be and provided some detail 
on how a program manager uses EVM tools.  This study will utilize EVM data to analyze 
how cost variances have changed during and after reform and to determine if there are 
discernable time lags between reform and cost variance perturbations. 
Past Research  
This section summarizes different research studies related to effectiveness of 
acquisition reform and to program cost growth and cost variance.  These studies and their 
results motivated this study and provided insight into methodology and analysis. 
Drezner Study  
Drezner et al. conducted an empirical study in 1993 to quantify the magnitude of 
cost growth in weapon systems and to identify factors affecting cost growth (Drezner et 
al., 1993:xi).  The Drezner study utilized Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) data to 
calculate the cost growth for DoD programs.  The research looked at SAR data for 197 
DoD programs as of December 1990, and found that little improvement has occurred 
over time and that cost growth has fluctuated around 20 percent since the mid 1960’s 
(Drezner et al., 1993:xiii).  The results were not able to pinpoint a single factor that 
affected cost growth, but reasoned “the apparent consistency in cost growth could be 
   
30 
explained in terms of incomplete or incorrect implementation of the various cost control 
and budgeting initiatives, due to strong institutional barriers” (Drezner et al., 1993:xiv).  
Results also highlighted that “until later in this decade [1990-2000] we will not be able to 
detect whether initiatives implemented as a result of the Packard Commission or the more 
recent DMR have had the desired effect” (Drezner et al., 1993:50).   
Searle Study 
In 1997, empirical research by Searle studied the impact of the Packard 
Commission on reducing cost overruns within major defense acquisition programs.  
Searle analyzed contracts that were completed between 1 January 1988 and 31 December 
1995 (Searle, 1997:45).  Searle concluded that not only did contract cost overruns not 
improve following the Packard Commission, but also they worsened in the years 
following implementation (Searle, 1997:76).  Specifically, Searle found that the 
worsening effect was found on development contracts while production contracts 
experienced no significant change as a result of the Packard Commission 
recommendations (Searle, 1997:82).  Searle’s methodology and recommendations 
motivated this study. 
Coopers and Lybrand 
In October 1997, Coopers and Lybrand conducted an opinion survey to see how 
effective DoD programs were at implementing acquisition reform initiatives originated 
through legislation or policy changes, at the contract level (Coopers and Lybrand, 
1997:2).  The researchers surveyed 10 defense contractors to assess implementation.  The 
survey covered 90 contracts valued at $17.4 billion (Coopers and Lybrand, 1997:3).  In 
the realm of costs, the survey respondents noted significant savings in elimination of 
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military specifications, commercial exemption to cost or pricing data and using an open 
systems approach (Coopers and Lybrand, 1997:15).  The Coopers and Lybrand team 
concluded that “there is a strong empirical basis for demonstrating that significant 
progress has been made over the past four years in the implementation of acquisition 
reform in DoD contracts” (Coopers and Lybrand, 1997:7).  This study attempts to 
determine if the Coopers and Lybrand assessment of “significant progress” is true from 
contract cost performance point of view. 
Christensen and Templin Study 
Christensen and Templin (2002) conducted an empirical study to determine if 
acquisition reform initiatives spurred by the Navy’s A-12 program cancellation (1991) 
had impacted cost performance (Christensen and Templin, 2002:105).  Christensen and 
Templin analyzed 240 defense contracts and found that the post A-12 time period 
(defined as those contracts which began after 31 December 1991) contracts experienced 
improved cost performance (Christensen and Templin, 2002:113-114).  The study also 
suggested that “transitional” time period contracts (contracts started before reform events 
and finished after reform events) experience worse cost performance due to the 
turbulence experienced during change (Christensen and Templin, 2002:114). 
Chapter Summary 
Chapter 2 provided a review of the reform initiatives that the DoD has worked 
through over the past 32 years.  This review is a fundamental building block of the Phase 
Two analysis for developing the timeline of acquisition reform events.  Acquisition 
Reform is nothing new to the DoD.  The difference today is a reduced budget, changed 
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military and defense environment, and new leadership.  EVM is a well-established 
management tool and the valuable cost variance information it provides on DoD contracts 
will be utilized in this study.  The prior research discussed in this chapter laid the 
foundation for this research area, motivated the research objectives and clarified the 
methodology employed in this study.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology for studying 
DoD contracts for the cost variance and “rule of thumb” analysis. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter explains the analysis process for this research effort.  It begins with a 
description of the database and data used, and explains the phases of analysis conducted.  
Each phase is broken down into explanations of research design, population, variables 
studied, hypotheses tested and how the data was prepared for each analysis phase.   
Data Collection 
The data utilized for the analysis comes from the Defense Acquisition Executive 
Summary (DAES) system.  The DAES was established in 1984 and serves as an internal 
Department of Defense (DoD) reporting document (AFMC Financial Management 
Handbook, 2001:38-12).  The DAES serves two primary functions:  to provide progress 
information to DoD leadership on Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and to 
provide the DoD acquisition community feedback (DAES Web:1; DoD 5000-2R, 
2001:C7.15.3).  
The DAES is maintained by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (OUSD[AT&L]) and contains cost and schedule 
performance data on more than 500 contracts since the early 1970s (Christensen and 
Templin, 2000:197).  The earned value management data used in this study is taken from 
the DAES database.  This data is summarized from contractor Cost Performance Reports 
(CPR) by government program offices and deemed reliable by the contractor’s 
requirements under the EVM system criteria described in Chapter 2 (Christensen and 
Templin, 2000:197; Christensen and Templin, 2002:108; Gordon, 1996:33-34).  The 
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criteria “are internal controls intended to encourage adequate planning and control” 
(Christensen and Templin, 2002:108).  The government deems the performance data 
reliable when the contractor is compliant with EVM system criteria (Christensen and 
Templin, 2002:108). 
Data from the DAES used for this study is current as of June 2002.  The DAES 
database contains multiple fields to describe each contract contained within the system.  
For the purposes of this study the following fields were used to prepare the data and 
perform the necessary calculations for the two phases of analysis: 
• Submit Date – date the CPR data is submitted to OUSD[AT&L] for inclusion 
into the database. 
 
• Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) – cost incurred in accomplishing the 
work performed. 
 
• Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) – earned value, also the estimated 
cost of the work performed. 
 
• Contract Budget Base (CBB) – the total of all negotiated cost of the contract. 
 
• Management Reserve (MR) – contractor’s contingency budget; part of CBB. 
 
• Contract ID (CID) – identifies what service manages the contract. 
 
• Contract Type (CTYPE) – identifies whether contract is cost plus, fixed price 
or some combination/hybrid. 
 
• Program Phase (PPHASE) – identifies if contract is for production or 
development phase of program life cycle. 
 
Phase One Analysis 
Research Design 
Chapter 2 detailed the history of acquisition reform and the timeline of the current 
acquisition reform initiatives.  The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994 
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marked the congressional initiation of the reform effort for the DoD, however, within the 
department the reform effort was already under way.  The assignment of Colleen Preston 
as the first Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform (DUSD[AR]) in 
June 1993, jump started DoD’s reform initiatives (Munechika, 1997:31).  By the start of 
fiscal year 1995, the DoD had complied with all applicable components of Title V of the 
FASA, those aimed at better cost control goals and implementation of those goals 
(GAO/NSIAD-97-22BR:2).  This early headway and initial success was further 
evidenced by speeches of both the Kaminski in February 1997 and Gansler in March 
1998 (Kaminski, 1997; Gansler, 1998). 
This study will utilize a cut-off date of 31 December 1997.  This date was selected 
for the following reasons: 
• Passage of Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (late 1996), which mandated 
budget for training and education; 
 
• DoD 5000 Series update released in 1997; and 
 
• Speeches by Kaminski and Gansler regarding success to date in 1997 and 
1998, respectively. 
 
Consistent with the Searle study, this date is judgmentally selected (Searle, 1997:45).  
This delineation date also allows for four years of analysis, based on the June 2002 
DAES database, on each side of the cut-off date for comparison of cost performance.  
This study will use statistical analysis to compare the before (1 January 1994 –              
31 December 1997) population to the after (1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) 
population to assess the impact of the current reform initiatives on cost performance. 
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Research Population 
The previous sections laid the groundwork for defining the research population 
for Phase One.  The first review of the database was to eliminate any contracts that did 
not have EVM data, both BCWP and ACWP, as cost performance cannot be assessed 
against contracts without this information (DSMC Gold Card, 2000).  The pre-current 
reform period is defined as 1 January 1994 to 31 December 1997 and the post-current 
reform period is defined as 1 January 1998 to 31 December 2001.  Only contracts that 
completed work during this eight year time period are included in this phase.  Consistent 
with the Searle study in 1997, the database was further divided into either development or 
production phases (Searle, 1997:46).  For this portion of Phase One analysis, any contract 
not indicating the phase was eliminated from a program phase comparison.  The division 
scheme for program phase is defined in Table 11.  Any contracts that were not identified 
by any of the terms in Table 11 were eliminated from the program phase comparison, as 
were contracts that contained multiple terms from both the production phase and 
development phase columns. 
Table 11.  Program Phase Division Identifiers  
Production Phase Development Phase
Production Development
Ship Construct Full Scale Development (FSD) or (FSED)
LRIP Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD)
Procurement Engineering Development 
Prod and Deploy Research Development (RDT&E)
Fabrication DEV 
PROD Sys Dev  
Similar to the program phase comparison, the data was divided by contract type, 
either cost plus or fixed price.  This portion of the analysis is similar to the program 
   
37 
phase, but considers reform impact based on contract type.  This research expects to see a 
significant change for both contract types as all contracts were equally affected by the 
FASA (see Chapter 2, Table 6) (DSMC FASA).  Therefore, any contracts that did not 
contain information on contract type, or contained a hybrid (e.g. FPI/AF/CPAF), were 
excluded from this portion of the analysis. 
Completed Contract Defined 
The DAES database does not contain earned value data for all contracts at the 
100% completion point (Searle 1997:47; Christensen and Templin, 2002:108).  Prior 
research indicates that at the 75% completion point, contract cost performance remains 
relatively stable (Gordon, 1996:Ch 3; Searle, 1997:47;).  Searle points out that “the 
contract is nearly complete at this point [75% and greater] in terms of the costs incurred” 
(Searle, 1997:47).  This study defines completion in the same manner.  The completed 
contract cost data used in the analysis is the last report submittal date for contracts at 75% 
or greater and meet the cut-off dates defined previously for pre- and post-reform time 
periods. 
The DAES database does not contain a field that defines percent completion.  
This value must be calculated using the data available.  Equations 1 and 2 are used to 
calculate percent complete.  The Contract Budget Base (CBB) contains the Budget at 
Complete (BAC), which is the total cost of the planned work, and Management Reserve 
(MR).   The percent complete simply relates the current amount of work complete, or 
BCWP, to the total amount of work on the contract, represented by the BAC (DSMC 
Gold Card, 2000).   
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BAC = CBB – MR          (1) 
 
Percent Complete = BCWP / BAC          (2) 
 
At this point, the database is ready for the necessary analysis to reduce it to the two 
samples necessary for the Phase One analysis. 
Sample Defined 
The samples utilized for this study included all DAES database contract 
information that meets all of the following requirements: 
• Completion (75% or greater) as of the cut-off dates for pre- and post-
acquisition reform periods 
 
• Defined as either production or development (as defined in Table 11) for 
production and development program phase analysis 
 
• Defined as either a Cost Plus or Fixed Price contract type for contract type 
analysis 
 
Table 12 provides statistics on the samples available from the DAES database meeting all 
the listed requirements and used for this study.  The numbers represent number of 
contracts utilized in each period and portion of the analysis. 
Table 12.  Study Sample Statistics 
Group Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
(1 Jan 94 - 31 Dec 97) (1 Jan 98 - 31 Dec 01)
All DoD contracts 109 95
Program Phase
    Production 61 34
Development 36 44
Contract Type
Cost Plus 40 60
Fixed Price 59 29  
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The analysis uses all contracts for each part of the Phase One analysis.  For example, 
comparing all contracts, 109 pre-reform completed contracts are compared against 95 
post-reform completed contracts.  For the program phase portion of the analysis, 10 of the 
109 pre-reform contracts and 17 of the 95 post-reform contracts are removed because all 
27 of the excluded contracts do not contain distinct (Table 11) program phase 
information.  For the contract type portion of the analysis, 10 of the 109 pre-reform 
contracts and 6 of the 95 post-reform contracts are excluded because all 16 of the 
excluded contracts do not contain specific contract type information.  In these cases, 
either there is no contract type data or the contract type is a fixed price/cost plus hybrid.   
Research Variable 
This study is concerned with analyzing the impact of acquisition reform on cost 
performance.  The final overrun (FO) of each sample contract is calculated with  
Equation 3.  This equation takes the actual cost of work performed (ACWP) data and 
compares it to the budgeted cost of work performed (BCWP).  Both the ACWP and the 
BCWP values used in this analysis are the final reported values for all sample contracts. 
 
FO = ACWP – BCWP          (3) 
 
As a result of the equation used for this analysis, all overruns will compute as a positive 
number, which is contrary to how overruns are reported in the EVM system and 
associated reports.  This is important to note for understanding the results of the 
hypotheses testing and for Phase Two analysis.  Therefore, a negative FO value would 
indicate a cost underrun for the completed contract in the sample. 
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 The comparison of final overruns or underruns does, however, have one problem.  
A larger dollar value contract would overshadow performance on a smaller dollar value 
contract.  Therefore, the data must be normalized in order to do conduct a reliable 
comparison.  This adjustment calculates the final overrun percentage (FO%), as this 
statistic will have the same meaning regardless of the size of the contract studied.  
Equation 4 illustrates how this is computed.  As noted previously, a negative percentage 
indicates a final underrun percentage.  The use of the final overrun percentage equation 
takes the final overrun, as calculated in Equation 3, and divides this value by the BCWP. 
 
FO% = Final Overrun (FO) / BCWP          (4) 
 
To perform the comparison of the cost performance for the pre- and post-reform 
population samples, this study uses the mean FO% of each sample as the study 
parameter.  This is computed using the equation given in Equation 5 (Searle, 1997:51). 
 
nFOFO
n
/%%
1






= ∑           (5) 
                                           i  = the ith contract in population 
                                           n = total number of contracts in population                           
 
Research Question and Hypotheses 
Research question:  Did the current acquisition reform initiatives have an effect 
on contract cost performance?  To answer this question, the following five hypotheses are 
tested: 
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Hypothesis 1:  Is the mean FO% for all DoD pre-reform (1 January 1994 –         
31 December 1997) contracts different than the mean FO% for all DoD post-reform       
(1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) contracts? 
Ho: mean FO%pre-reform = mean FO%post -reform 
Ha: mean FO%pre-reform ≠ mean FO%post -reform  
If the null hypothesis is true, this would indicate that the current reform period did not 
have a significant impact on cost performance.  If the alternate hypothesis is true, this 
would indicate the opposite, that the current reform period did have a significant impact 
on cost performance.  
Hypotheses 2 and 3:  Is the mean FO% for DoD pre-reform (1 January 1994 –    
31 December 1997) contracts different than the mean FO% for DoD post-reform            
(1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) contracts in the development or production phase? 
Ho: mean FO%pre-reform (development phase)  = mean FO%post-reform (development phase) 
Ha: mean FO%pre-reform (development phase) ≠ mean FO%post -reform (development phase) 
 
Ho: mean FO%pre-reform (production phase)  = mean FO%post -reform (production phase) 
Ha: mean FO%pre-reform (production phase) ≠ mean FO%post -reform (production phase) 
 
If the null hypothesis is true, this would indicate that the current reform period did not 
have a significant impact on cost performance for development or production contracts, 
respectively.  If the alternate hypothesis is true, this would indicate the opposite, that the 
current reform period did have a significant impact on cost performance for development 
or production contracts, respectively.  
.Hypotheses 4 and 5:  Is the mean FO% for DoD pre-reform (1 January 1994 –   
31 December 1997) contracts different than the mean FO% for DoD post-reform            
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(1 January 1998 – 31 December 2001) contracts based on contract type (cost plus and 
fixed price)? 
Ho: mean FO%pre-reform (cost plus contracts)  = mean FO%post-reform (cost plus contracts) 
Ha: mean FO%pre-reform (cost plus contracts) ≠ mean FO%post -reform (cost plus contracts)  
 
Ho: mean FO%pre-reform (fixed price contracts)  = mean FO%post-reform (fixed price contracts)  
Ha: mean FO%pre-reform (fixed price contracts)  ≠ mean FO%post -reform (fixed price contracts) 
 
If the null hypothesis is true, this would indicate that the current reform period did 
not have a significant impact on cost performance for cost plus or fixed price contracts, 
respectively.  If the alternate hypothesis is true, this would indicate the opposite, that the 
current reform period did have a significant impact on cost performance for cost plus or 
fixed price contracts, respectively.  
Statistical Analysis 
The Phase One analysis hypotheses all involve comparing mean values and 
testing to see if they are statistically similar or different.  The first step in conducting the 
tests is to decide whether to use a parametric or nonparametric test.  Parametric tests 
make specific assumptions with regard to the population parameters that characterize the 
underlying distributions for which the test is employed (Sheskin, 2000:33).  
Nonparametric tests make no assumptions about the population parameters (Sheskin, 
2000:33).   
The t-test for two independent samples involves using the two sample means to 
estimate the values of the means of the populations from which they come (Sheskin, 
2000:247).  If the result of the t-test is significant, the conclusion will be that “there is a 
high likelihood that the samples represent populations with different means” (Sheskin, 
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2000:247).  The following assumptions regarding the sample data must be met to use the 
two-sample t-test:  the sample data has been randomly selected from the population and 
the populations are independent of each other; the population data comes from a normal 
distribution; and the populations must have the same variance (Sheskin, 2000:247).  
Should any of the assumptions required for use of the t-test be violated, it is possible that 
any results generated from conducting the two-sample t-test may be inaccurate or 
compromised (Sheskin 2000:247).   
The analogous nonparametric test to the two-sample t-test is the Mann-Whitney U 
test; useful when the normality assumption is violated (Devore, 2000:659; Searle, 
1997:55; Sheskin, 2000:269).  Research has shown that the Mann-Whitney U test 
provides a powerful test option when the normality assumption has been violated 
(Sheskin, 2000:297).  Many statisticians consider the Mann-Whitney U test the best 
nonparametric test for location (Gibbons, 1971:149; Searle, 1997:56).  The Mann-
Whitney U test is 95% as efficient in discerning significant population differences 
compared to the two-sample t-test when the normality assumption is met, but is over 
100% as efficient in doing the same when the normality assumption is not met (Sheskin, 
2000:297).   
Empirical evidence shows that the two-sample t-test is reasonably robust, 
meaning it provides reliable information about the underlying sampling distribution, 
despite violation of any of the assumptions (Sheskin, 2000:269).  Researchers argue that 
parametric tests, the two-sample t-test in particular, are more powerful than their 
analogous nonparametric tests (Sheskin, 2000:270).  Previous research shows that cost 
variances are not normally distributed; therefore, both the two-sample t-test and the 
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Mann-Whitney U test will be used to ensure completeness (Christensen and Templin, 
2002:108).   
For all hypothesis testing, a significance level (alpha value [α]) of .05 will be 
used.  The results will be presented with the appropriate test statistic value, but will be 
explained using p-values.  The p-value is the smallest level of significance at which the 
null hypothesis (Ho) would be rejected when a specified test procedure is used (Devore, 
2000:342).  The p-value is then compared against the alpha level (.05) to either accept or 
reject the null hypothesis (Devore, 2000:342).  Table 13 displays the acceptance and 
rejection criteria for the tests using p-values (Devore, 2000:342).  The smaller the p-
value, the more contradictory is the data to the null hypothesis (Devore, 2000:342).  The 
benefit of p-values is that they convey information about the strength of evidence against 
the null hypothesis (Ho) and allow a decision maker to draw conclusions at any specified 
level of significance (α) (Devore, 2000:340). 
Table 13.  Hypothesis Test Decision Table 
P-value ≤ .05 ⇒ reject H0 at level .05 
P-value > .05 ⇒ do not reject H0 at level .05 
 
Data Preparation 
Prior to conducting hypothesis testing, the assumptions of the two-sample t-test 
and the Mann-Whitney U test will be determined.  The sample data must be analyzed to 
assess independence, randomness, normality and constant variance (two-sample t-test 
only).  The purpose of this assessment is to determine beforehand which testing method 
is most appropriate to aid in interpreting the results in Chapter 4. 
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Independence 
In the Searle study (1997), independence was assumed based on the following: 
• Likeness caused by legislation and regulation would affect cost performance 
equally across all DoD contracts; and 
 
• Multiple contracts under similar program managers are run by a multitude of 
cost management contractors and personnel (Searle, 1997:58-59). 
 
The characteristics of the populations utilized in this study, and their respective samples, 
are the same.  All DoD contracts are managed under the same legislation and regulations.  
In fact, the point of this study to see if changes to the legislation and regulations impacted 
cost performance by comparing pre- and post-reform populations.  Within each 
population, there are a multitude of support contractors and financial management 
personnel, with varying degrees of experience and training, performing cost management 
activities.  For these reasons, independence of the populations can be assumed.  However, 
it is important to acknowledge the possibility that the samples do not satisfy the 
independence requirement, which could invalidate the results of the analysis.   
 Random Sample 
 Random sample is defined as “one for which any particular subset of the specified 
size has the same chance of being selected” (Devore, 2000:8).  In this study, all 
applicable population data contained in the DAES database is used in the analysis.  
However, because “applicable data” contains contracts that have all the necessary EVM 
data reported, the sample cannot be true random samples.  The population samples 
contain all available data points contained in the DAES database, therefore, the random 
sample requirement is assumed.  However, it is critical to note that without the random 
sample assumption satisfied, the results of this study would be questionable. 
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 Normality and Equality of Variance 
 Normality will be tested both subjectively and objectively.  The subjective 
assessment will consist of normal probability plots.  According to D’Agostino and 
Stephens, normal probability plotting should always accompany a formal test of 
normality (D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986:405).  A straight line would indicate the 
existence of an underlying normal distribution for the sample data (D’Agostino and 
Stephens, 1986:35).  The graphical representation serves only as an informal preliminary 
judgment of normality and supports formal numerical techniques (D’Agostino and 
Stephens, 1986:41). 
 The Shapiro-Wilk test for normality will serve as the objective assessment.  The 
Shapiro-Wilk test is a powerful non-graphical test for the assumption of normality 
(D’Agostino and Stephens, 1986:406; Searle, 1997:60; Verrill, 1981:3).  The Shapiro-
Wilk test p-value will also indicate the significance of any violations of the normality 
assumption.  The null hypothesis of this test is that the data comes from a normal 
distribution (Searle, 1997:66; White, 2002).  Therefore, any p-values less than or equal to 
.05 would indicate a non-normal distribution.  
 The test for equal variances involves a hypothesis test using the F distribution 
(Devore, 2000:393).  The null hypothesis is that the population variances are equal.  The 
test statistic is computed using the ratio of the sample variances (Devore, 2000:393; 
Searle, 1997:60).  Again, the p-value will be used to assess either the acceptance or 
rejection of the equal variance null hypothesis, with a significance level of .05.  The 
Levene Test for Equality of Variances is used in this study because this test is less 
sensitive to departures from normality (Neter, Kutner, Nachtsheim, and Wasserman, 
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1996:112; NIST/SEMATECH, 2003).  This is important as prior research indicates that 
cost variance data tends to be non-normally distributed (Christensen and Templin, 
2002:108).  The results of the Levene Test will dictate the specific t test employed for the 
parametric hypothesis testing.  If the test indicates equal variances, the pooled t test will 
be selected as this outperforms the two-sample t test by reducing the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when null hypothesis is true (Devore, 2000:370).  
Conversely, when the Levene test results indicate unequal variances, the standard two-
sample t test procedures will be selected as the pooled t test can lead to erroneous 
conclusions if applied when the variances are different (Devore, 2000:370). 
Phase One Summary 
This section detailed the Phase One analysis methodology.  The treatment date 
and study populations and samples were defined, research variable and hypotheses 
explained, and methods of testing detailed.  The tests of assumptions are conducted to 
indicate which test method is most appropriate.  For all hypotheses, both the parametric 
two-sample t-test and nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test will be utilized for 
completeness.   
Phase Two Analysis 
Research Design 
The second phase of analysis is focused on discovering the existence of any 
trends or time lags between acquisition reform initiatives and cost performance changes, 
either positive or negative.  This phase does not include statistical tests, but simply plots 
the cost performance of all active contracts over the time period provided in the DAES 
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database and determines if consistent trends or time lags exist in an effort to develop a 
“rule of thumb”.  The research conducted for Chapter 2 of this report provides sufficient 
information to develop a timeline of acquisition reform initiatives, starting with Packard 
in 1970 and concluding with the Clinger-Cohen Act in 1996.  The DAES database 
contains earned value data for contracts from 1970 to June 2002 for the cost performance 
assessment. 
Research Population and Sample 
The research population consists of all contracts reported in the DAES database.  
The sample selected from the population includes all contracts that provide earned value 
data.  Any contract with incomplete earned value data was eliminated from this analysis 
because cost performance cannot be assessed.  The analysis used all available contracts 
because all contracts are managed under the same regulations and legislation and the 
DoD and Congress are concerned with all DoD contracts, not solely with any particular 
service. 
Similar to Phase One, the analysis will also look at program phase and contract 
type to see if reform initiatives affect these contracts differently.  The division scheme 
utilized is exactly the same as performed in phase one.  Any contracts from the “all 
contracts” sample explained in the prior paragraph that did not contain information on 
specific program phase (Table 11) or specific contract type (either fixed price or cost 
plus) were eliminated from this portion of the phase two analysis. 
Research Variable 
Phase Two analysis focused on cost performance over time by looking at DoD’s 
overall contract cost performance at snapshots over time.  The snapshots are determined 
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by the DAES submittal dates as reported in the DAES database.  For each submittal date, 
the mean ACWP and BCWP are calculated.  Equation 6 illustrates how these are 
calculated.  The mean ACWP and mean BCWP are used to account for the inconsistent 
number of contracts reported in different submittal periods, as well as adjust for periods 
when larger contracts and/or smaller contracts are reported (same for Phase One).  These 
calculations also give values for the average amount of work completed to date compared 
against the average cost of the same work.  Utilizing the mean helps eliminate spikes 
caused by a period of larger contracts or a period of smaller contracts and provides a 
measure of the center for the ACWP and BCWP (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and 
Hyndman, 1998:29).  
 
nACWPACWP
n
ij /
1






= ∑           (6) 
                                           i  = the ith submittal in month j 
                                           n = total number of submittals in month j                                           
 
The variable used in this analysis phase is the mean cost overrun percentage for 
each year.  Equations 7, 8, and 9 illustrate the necessary calculations.  This mean 
accounts for differences in reporting from year to year and provides a measure of the 
center of the data (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:29).  In the DAES 
database, some years have eleven months of reporting, while other years have four.  
Similar to the interim calculation in Equation 6, this averaging smoothes out any monthly 
spikes caused by the inconsistent reporting contained in the database.  Again, it also 
provides values for the average amount of work completed (mean BCWP) compared 
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against the average cost of that work (mean ACWP).  The mean cost overrun percentage 
is calculated as a positive number for overruns and a negative number for underruns; the 
same procedure used in Phase One.  This method was selected for the appearance of the 
time plots. 
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                                           j  = the jth monthly submittal in year k 
                                           m = total number of monthly submittals in year k                                           
 
kkk BCWPACWPCO −=           (8) 
kkk BCWPCOCO /% =           (9) 
                                           k = the kth year of DAES reporting                                   
 
Trend Versus Timeline Analysis 
The most obvious graphical form for time series data is the time plot in which the 
data are plotted over time (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:24).  A time 
plot will reveal any trends over time (Chatfield, 1996:11; Makridakis, Wheelwright, and 
Hyndman, 1998:24).  The goal is to see if a “rule of thumb” can be determined based on 
visually examining cost performance over time against the backdrop of acquisition 
reform initiative implementation.   
A forecasting concept that is useful in describing any noted trends is intervention 
analysis.  Interventions are one-time events that have an impact on a variable (mean cost 
overrun %) (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:418).  The intervention is 
assumed to occur at one time period only, but the impact can be instantaneous or spread 
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over time (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:418).  Acquisition reform 
initiatives represent interventions; either of DoD leadership, Congress, or both, to impact 
the way the defense community acquires weapon systems.  There are four types of 
interventions that will be considered in this analysis.  They are step-based interventions, 
pulse-based interventions, decayed response interventions, and delayed response 
interventions (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:419-422).  Figure 5 
graphically shows what each of these interventions might look like (Makridakis, 
Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:420).   
 
Step 
Decayed  Response Pulse 
Delayed Response 
 
Figure 5.  Intervention Graphical Representation 
Step-based interventions are where there is a sudden and lasting drop or rise in the 
variable (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:419).  A pulse-based 
intervention affects the variable at the point of intervention but nowhere else 
(Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:422).  A decayed response intervention 
has an immediate impact but then decays away slowly (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and 
Hyndman, 1998:422).  Delayed-response interventions will cause a rise or fall in the 
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variable, but not instantaneously (Makridakis, Wheelwright, and Hyndman, 1998:421).  
The goal in this analysis will be to determine if there is a common intervention 
description for acquisition reform initiatives and the time period associated with the 
impact. 
Phase Two Summary 
Phase Two analysis is focused on analyzing the cost performance of DoD 
contracts, in total, by phase and contract type.  This will be accomplished with the use to 
time plots of the mean cost overrun percentage versus time (1970 – 2002).  The goal is to 
identify any existence of trends between acquisition reform initiatives and cost 
performance change.  The goal is also to place a time period with any consistent pattern 
of intervent ion impact.   
Phase Three Analysis 
Phase Three analysis will only be conducted if results from Phase One and Phase 
Two indicate a new treatment date for hypothesis testing should be considered.  The 
hypotheses tested and hypothesis testing procedures would be identical to Phase One.  
The only differences would be in population and sample for pre- and post-reform periods.  
Statistics regarding the samples and treatment date selected will be represented in 
Chapter 4, if Phase Three becomes necessary. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter explained the methodology employed to conduct the phases of 
analysis.  Phases One and Three focus on conducting hypothesis tests on pre-reform and 
post-reform contracts to see if there is a significant difference in cost performance.  Phase 
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Two focuses on visually analyzing DoD contract cost performance over time to identify 
any trends and time lags between the implementation of acquisition reform initiatives and 
cost performance changes.  Chapter 4 provides the analysis results. 
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IV.  Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the results of the phase analyses.  The results of all 
statistical tests and graphical analysis are presented by each individual phase.   
Phase One  
The purpose of Phase One was to test to see if a difference existed between pre-
reform contracts and post-reform contracts by performing hypothesis tests of the mean 
final cost overrun percentage of each sample.  The treatment date used for Phase One was 
31 December 1997.  The analysis consisted of five hypothesis tests; one test for all 
contracts, one for fixed price contracts, one for cost plus contracts, one for production 
phase contracts, and one for development phase contracts.  Table 12 provides data on the 
number of contracts used in each hypothesis test.  The Phase One results are separated by 
each applicable hypothesis test. 
Prior to any hypothesis testing of the means, the samples were tested to determine 
which hypothesis testing method, either parametric or non-parametric, was more 
appropriate.  If a sample appears to be normally distributed, then that sample is tested to 
assess constant variance.  Both assumptions are essential for the two-sample t-test.  
Regardless of the assumption test results, both the parametric (two-sample t-test) and 
non-parametric (Mann-Whitney U Test) are used.  The assumption test results simply 
give credence to which mean hypothesis testing method is more credible.  All normal 
probability plots are found in Appendix B and the Shapiro-Wilk test values are found in 
each test results section. 
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A statistical software package, JMP 4.0, calculated all statistical test values used 
in this study.  The software uses the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for 
testing the means.  The Mann-Whitney test is equivalent to the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
(a.k.a. the Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test) used by the JMP 4.0 software (Devore, 2000:659; 
Gibbons, 1985:148; Sheskin, 2000:313).  The p-values are the same for both tests. 
The results for the two-sample t test are listed for each test.  In cases where the 
Levene test for equal variances indicates that the variances are not equal, the Welch 
ANOVA test p-value is used.  The Welch ANOVA is equivalent to the unequal variance 
two-sample t test when comparing two sample means (JMP 4.0, 2001).  Conversely, 
when the Levene Test indicates that the variances are equal, the equal variance two-
sample t test (pooled t procedure) p-value is used.  
Hypothesis Test #1 – All DoD 
The first hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of all pre-reform contracts (1 Jan 94 – 31 Dec 97) is significantly different than 
the mean FO% of all post-reform contracts (1 Jan 98 – 31 Dec 01).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .8119 and a p-value of .0000.  These values indicate a non-normal 
distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the post-
reform sample produced a test statistic value of .6675 and a p-value of .0000.  These 
values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a significance 
level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal; therefore more emphasis 
will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample t-test.   
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The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 2.9127 and a 
p-value of .0894.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 14.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 14.  Phase One – Hypothesis Test #1 Results 
All DoD contracts
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.2522 6.2478
Std Error 1.399 1.498
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 9309.5 -0.978
P-value 0.3094 0.3293  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample. 
Hypothesis Test #2 – Development Phase 
The first hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of pre-reform development phase contracts (1 Jan 94 – 31 Dec 97) is significantly 
different than the mean FO% of post-reform development phase contracts (1 Jan 98 –     
31 Dec 01).   
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Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .8833 and a p-value of .0010.  These values indicate a non-normal 
distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the post-
reform sample produced a test statistic value of .8506 and a p-value of less than .0001.  
These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample       
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 12.5972 and 
a p-value of .0007.  This result indicates that the population variances are not equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the Welch ANOVA test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 15.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 15.  Phase One – Hypothesis Test #2 Results 
Development Phase
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 11.0208 7.0911
Std Error 2.134 1.93
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 1503.5 -1.366
P-value 0.6634 0.176  
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The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample. 
Hypothesis Test #3 – Production Phase 
The third hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of pre-reform production phase contracts (1 Jan 94 – 31 Dec 97) is significantly 
different than the mean FO% of post-reform production phase contracts (1 Jan 98 –       
31 Dec 01).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7144 and a p-value of less than .0001.  These values indicate a non-
normal distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the 
post-reform sample produced a test statistic value of .6022 and a p-value of less than 
.0001.  These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal; therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample       
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of .5688 and a 
p-value of .4527.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
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Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 16.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 16.  Phase One – Hypothesis Test #3 Results 
Production Phase
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.1880 6.7682
Std Error 2.216 2.968
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 1407 -0.383
P-value 0.0814 0.7023  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample for production phase contracts. 
Hypothesis Test #4 – Cost Plus Contracts 
The fourth hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun 
percentage (FO%) of cost-plus pre-reform contracts (1 Jan 94 – 31 Dec 97) is 
significantly different than the mean FO% of cost-plus post-reform contracts (1 Jan 98 – 
31 Dec 01).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .8454 and a p-value of less than .0001.  These values indicate a non-
normal distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the 
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post-reform sample produced a test statistic value of .8461 and a p-value of less than 
.0001.  These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample        
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 7.2882 and a 
p-value of .0082.  This result indicates that the population variances are not equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the Welch ANOVA test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 17.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 17.  Phase One – Hypothesis Test #4 Results 
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 5.1422 5.5138
Std Error 1.739 1.420
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 1820.5 0.165
P-value 0.1614 0.8689  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample for cost plus contracts. 
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Hypothesis Test #5 – Fixed Price Contracts 
The fifth hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of fixed price pre-reform contracts (1 Jan 94 – 31 Dec 97) is significantly 
different than the mean FO% of fixed price post-reform contracts (1 Jan 98 – 31 Dec 01).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7921 and a p-value of less than .0001.  These values indicate a non-
normal distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the 
post-reform sample produced a test statistic value of .6382 and a p-value of less than 
.0001.  These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample       
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 2.2736 and a 
p-value of .1353.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 18.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
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Table 18.  Phase One – Hypothesis Test #5 Results 
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.6052 8.4414
Std Error 2.156 3.075
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 1120 -0.044
P-value 0.1313 0.9653  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample for fixed price contracts. 
Sensitivity Testing 
Prior research indicates that over target baseline contracts may not be reliable data 
points for the hypothesis testing.  Over target baseline (OTB) contracts are contracts 
where the Total Allocated Budget (TAB) is greater than the Contract Budget Base 
(CBB), which is evidence that a contract’s performance measurement baseline exceeds 
the project targets and therefore is unstable (Gordon, 1996:3).  To test the sensitivity of 
the Phase One results, all OTB contracts were removed from the samples and the 
hypothesis tests were performed on the reduced samples.  Table 19 displays the new 
sample sizes by removing the OTB contracts.  The number of OTB contracts removed is 
in parentheses.  
The test statistic values and associated p-values are found in Appendix C.  All test 
values indicate no significant differences noted when removing the OTB contracts.  In all 
cases, the null hypotheses were not rejected at a significance level of .05. 
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Table 19. Phase One Samples (OTB Removed) 
Group Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
(1 Jan 94 - 31 Dec 97) (1 Jan 98 - 31 Dec 01)
All DoD contracts 75 (34) 75 (20)
Program Phase
    Production 38 (23) 26 (8)
Development 25 (11) 35 (9)
Contract Type
Cost Plus 32 (8) 47 (13)
Fixed Price 34 (25) 22 (7)  
 
Christensen and Templin discovered in their research that transitional contracts 
tend to experience poor cost performance (Christensen and Templin, 2002:114).  
Transitional contracts are defined as those contracts that start before the treatment date 
and end after the treatment date.  To test for the sensitivity of transitional contracts, the 
two samples used in the original hypothesis testing are separated into three samples; pre-
reform, transitional, and post-reform.  Pre-reform is the same as previously described in 
Chapter 3.  Transitional contracts are those which started prior to 31 December 97 and 
finished before 31 December 01, while post-reform contracts are those that started after 
31 December 97 and finished before 31 December 01.  Table 20 displays the sample size 
numbers for the three samples for each respective hypothesis test.  The samples were 
tested with and without the OTB contracts for robustness.   
In order to test for a difference in the three samples the use of different hypothesis 
testing procedures is required.  The parametric test employed is the single-factor analysis 
of variance (ANOVA).  The ANOVA test utilizes the F-distribution and similar 
assumptions apply as did for the two-sample t test; normally distributed and equal 
variance of the samples.  As noted in all two-sample testing, the samples are not normally 
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distributed, but the ANOVA test is conducted and reported for robustness.  The non-
parametric test used is the extension of the Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon test for 
independent samples; the Kruskal-Wallis test (Gibbons, 1985:317).  Both procedures test 
to see if any of the means are different (Devore, 2000:403-404; Gibbons, 1985:317) 
The resultant test statistic and p-values are in Appendix C.  The results indicate no 
significant difference between the means at a .05 significance (alpha) level.   
Table 20.  Phase One – Transitional Period Sensitivity Test Samples 
Group Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Contract Start Prior to 31 Dec 1997 Prior to 31 Dec 1997 1 Jan 1998 or later
Contract Complete Prior to 31 Dec 1997 1 Jan 1998 or later 1 Jan 1998 or later
All DoD contracts 109 86 9
Program Phase
    Production 61 30 4
Development 36 40 4
Contract Type
Cost Plus 40 54 6
Fixed Price 59 24 5  
Phase Two 
The purpose of Phase Two was to analyze cost performance data over time to see 
any visible indications of acquisition reform initiative implementation and cost 
performance change.  The analysis consisted of visually analyzing the plotted data to see 
any indications of change.  The second part of the analysis is to apply the intervention 
concepts discussed in Chapter 3 to see if there is a common pattern exhibited between 
reform implementation and cost performance behavior. 
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Trend vs. Timeline Visual Analysis 
The first step in this portion of the analysis involved setting up all the calculations 
explained in Chapter 3.  This was all performed utilizing Microsoft Excel.  The next step 
was to plot the va lues calculated from equation 9 against a timeline backdrop of 
acquisition reform initiatives.  Figure 6 displays the graph for all contracts and   
Appendix D contains graphs for all DoD contracts broken out by program phase and 
contract type.  The graph in Figure 6 displays a line for each service department (Air 
Force, Army, Navy) and a line for all DoD, which includes each service and any 
contracts that are not service-specific (e.g. Ballistic Missile Defense).   
 
Figure 6. Phase Two Trend vs. Timeline Chart  
This portion of the analysis highlights some noteworthy information.  First, each service 
exhibits common cost variance trends over time.  Each service data exhibits common 
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peaks and valleys.  This data behavior laid against the timeline provides a visual tool for 
assessment using the intervention analysis concepts. 
Intervention Analysis 
The most interesting behavior of the cost variance data is the sudden cost variance 
drops at or immediately following years where an acquisition reform report was issued or 
an initiative implemented.  Utilizing the intervention concepts used in forecasting, this 
behavior seems to follow either a pulse intervention or a decayed-response intervention.  
The cost variance tends to immediately improve (better performance) following an 
acquisition reform event.   Following the Carlucci Initiatives in 1982, the DoD-All trend 
line takes a dip down to 1.32% in 1983.  By 1986, the cost variance value is back to 6%.  
Following the Packard Commission in 1986, the cost variance value is 2.86% in 1987.  
By 1991, the cost variance is up to 22.93%, but on the heels of the Defense Management 
Report falls back to 14.4% in 1994.  In 1996, two years after the Federal Acquisition 
Streamlining Act of 1994 and as the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (FASA II) passes, the 
DoD cost variance value is down to 3.04%, and has not surpassed 4% since (as of June 
2002).   
The trend pattern exhibited in the data does give some potential to developing a 
rule of thumb.  Certainly, something happened to the cost performance of active contracts 
during the different acquisition reform events laid out in the timeline.  Further discussion 
of this relationship will occur in Chapter 5. 
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Phase Three 
In consideration of the fact that Phase One determined that there was no 
significant difference between the pre-reform and post-reform contracts further analysis 
was conducted.  As discussed in Chapter 3, Phase Three follows the same methodology 
as Phase One.  Phase Three uses a treatment date of 31 December 1994.  This treatment 
date was selected for the following three reasons: 
• Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Reform position 
created in June 1993; 
 
• GAO report stating DoD had complied with Title V of the FASA by Fiscal 
Year 1995 (Oct 1994); and  
 
• Active contract cost variance dip discovered in Phase Two analysis. 
 
Like Phase One, the pre-reform sample will consist of the four years before the treatment 
date and the post-reform period will consist of the four years following the treatment 
date.  Table 21 provides information on the sample sizes for each portion of the analysis.  
Table 21. Phase Three Sample Statistics 
Group Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
(1 Jan 91 - 31 Dec 94) (1 Jan 95 - 31 Dec 98)
All DoD contracts 156 116
Program Phase
    Production 97 52
Development 42 44
Contract Type
Cost Plus 32 57
Fixed Price 114 46  
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Hypothesis Test #1 – All DoD 
The first hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of all pre-reform contracts (1 Jan 91 – 31 Dec 94) is significantly different than 
the mean FO% of all post-reform contracts (1 Jan 95 – 31 Dec 98).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7623 and a p-value of .0000.  These values indicate a non-normal 
distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the post-
reform sample produced a test statistic value of .8108 and a p-value of .0000.  These 
values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a significance 
level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal; therefore more emphasis 
will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 1.0291 and a 
p-value of .3113.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 22.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
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Table 22.  Phase Three Hypothesis Test #1 Results 
All DoD contracts
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 9.3375 7.4027
Std Error 1.333 1.546
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 15110 -0.948
P-value 0.2595 0.344  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample. 
Hypothesis Test #2 – Development Phase 
The first hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of pre-reform development phase contracts (1 Jan 91 – 31 Dec 94) is significantly 
different than the mean FO% of post-reform development phase contracts (1 Jan 95 –    
31 Dec 98).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7802 and a p-value of less than .0001.  These values indicate a non-
normal distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the 
post-reform sample produced a test statistic value of .8834 and a p-value of .0002.  These 
values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a significance 
level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore more emphasis 
will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample t-test.   
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The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of .0212 and a 
p-value of .8846.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 23.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 23.  Phase Three – Hypothesis Test #2 Results 
Development Phase
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 12.0255 10.7675
Std Error 2.460 2.403
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 1841.5 -0.366
P-value 0.9037 0.7154  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample. 
Hypothesis Test #3 – Production Phase 
The third hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of pre-reform production phase contracts (1 Jan 91 – 31 Dec 94) is significantly 
different than the mean FO% of post-reform production phase contracts (1 Jan 95 –       
31 Dec 98).   
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Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7315 and a p-value of .0000.  These values indicate a non-normal 
distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the post-
reform sample produced a test statistic value of .6685 and a p-value of less than .0001.  
These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample       
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 1.6458 and a 
p-value of .2015.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 24.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 24.  Phase Three – Hypothesis Test #3 Results 
Production Phase
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.9002 6.0459
Std Error 1.842 2.516
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 3619 -0.915
P-value 0.264 0.3615  
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The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample for production phase contracts. 
Hypothesis Test #4 – Cost Plus Contracts 
The fourth hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun 
percentage (FO%) of cost-plus pre-reform contracts (1 Jan 91 – 31 Dec 94) is 
significantly different than the mean FO% of cost-plus post-reform contracts (1 Jan 95 – 
31 Dec 98).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7146 and a p-value of less than .0001.  These values indicate a non-
normal distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the 
post-reform sample produced a test statistic value of .8537 and a p-value of less than 
.0001.  These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample       
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of .1816 and a 
p-value of .6710.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
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Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 25.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 25.  Phase Three – Hypothesis Test #4 Results 
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.4189 5.9602
Std Error 2.498 1.872
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 1536.5 -0.788
P-value 0.4118 0.4331  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample for cost plus contracts. 
Hypothesis Test #5 – Fixed Price Contracts 
The fifth hypothesis tested to determine if the mean final cost overrun percentage 
(FO%) of fixed price pre-reform contracts (1 Jan 91 – 31 Dec 94) is significantly 
different than the mean FO% of fixed price post-reform contracts (1 Jan 95 – 31 Dec 98).   
Normality and Equal Variance Test Results 
The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the pre-reform sample produced a test 
statistic value of .7591 and a p-value of .0000.  These values indicate a non-normal 
distribution for the pre-reform sample.  The Shapiro-Wilk test conducted on the post-
reform sample produced a test statistic value of .8021 and a p-value of less than .0001.  
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These values indicate a non-normal distribution for the post-reform sample.  At a 
significance level of .05, both results indicate both samples are non-normal, therefore 
more emphasis will be placed on the Mann-Whitney test results over the two-sample       
t-test.   
The Levene test for equal variances produced a test statistic value of 1.9836 and a 
p-value of .1610.  This result indicates that the population variances are equal at a 
significance level of .05.  Therefore, the pooled t test results will be utilized in the 
analysis. 
Hypothesis Test Results 
The results of the hypothesis test are represented in Table 26.  The test statistic 
values and associated p-values are consistent.  At a significance level of .05, the results 
indicate that the null hypothesis is not rejected.  
Table 26.  Phase Three – Hypothesis Test #5 Results 
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-Reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 10.5542 6.9447
Std Error 1.638 2.579
Test Results Mann-Whitney Two-Sample t
Test Statistic (Ws) 3323 -1.181
P-value 0.1525 0.2392  
The Mann-Whitney results indicate that the two sample distributions do not differ 
in location and the two-sample t-test indicates the mean FO% for each sample is not 
significantly different.  Both results suggest that the mean FO% of the pre-reform sample 
is equal to the mean FO% of the post-reform sample for fixed price contracts. 
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Sensitivity Testing 
As performed in Phase One, the same sensitivity testing for the effects of OTB 
and transitional contracts was conducted.  Table 27 provides the new sample sizes for 
OTB contract removal in each respective category of hypothesis testing and Table 28 
provides new sample sizes for the breakout of transitional from the post-reform samples 
in each respective category.  The test results are contained in Appendix C.  Like Phase 
One, the results were insensitive to any effects from OTB contracts, in that no 
significance differences were found.  The results for testing for effects of transitional 
contracts by using the ANOVA and Kruskal-Wallis tests also indicated no significant 
differences in the three sample means at a .05 significance level.   
Table 27. Phase Three Samples (OTB Removed) 
Group Pre-Reform Post-Reform 
(1 Jan 91 - 31 Dec 94) (1 Jan 95 - 31 Dec 98)
All DoD contracts 118 (38) 91 (25)
Program Phase
    Production 79 (18) 35 (17)
Development 27 (15) 36 (8)
Contract Type
Cost Plus 23 (9) 50 (7)
Fixed Price 87 (27) 29 (17)  
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Table 28. Phase Three – Transitional Period Sensitivity Test Samples 
Group Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Contract Start Prior to 31 Dec 1994 Prior to 31 Dec 1994 1 Jan 1995 or later
Contract Complete Prior to 31 Dec 1994 1 Jan 1995 or later 1 Jan 1995 or later
All DoD contracts 156 106 10
Program Phase
    Production 97 47 5
Development 42 41 3
Contract Type
Cost Plus 32 50 7
Fixed Price 114 42 2  
Chapter Summary 
Phase One tested to find if any differences between pre-reform and post-reform 
contract cost performance existed.  With a reform treatment date of 31 December 1997, 
all five hypotheses test indicate that no difference exists.  During the sensitivity testing 
for effects of over target baseline and transitional contracts, the results were consistent; 
no differences found.  These results indicate no significant difference between pre-reform 
and post-reform contract cost performance with a treatment date of 31 December 1997. 
Phase Two analysis provided a time series plot of contract cost performance over 
the span of the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary database timeframe.  When 
plotted against major acquisition reform initiatives, contract cost performance appears to 
change at the time or immediately following each respective acquisition reform report or 
initiative.  Applying some forecasting tools to describe and possibly model the change, 
the impact appears to be a decayed response, where the change in cost performance 
decays over time back to some steady state.  This behavior is found to be common in both 
the development and production phases and for fixed price and cost plus contracts. 
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Phase Three tested the same hypotheses in Phase One, but with a new treatment 
date of 31 December 1994.  The evidence of no difference noted in Phase One, some 
organizational changes within the DoD, and the cost performance behavior identified in 
Phase Two were the genesis for the new treatment date.  The Phase Three results indicate 
no significant difference between pre-reform and post-reform contract cost performance.  
The results of sensitivity testing for effects of OTB and transitional contracts also 
indicated no significant differences between the sample means.   
This concludes the results for both sets of hypothesis tests and the time series plot 
visual analysis.  The statistical test results and p-values not shown in this chapter are in 
Appendix C and additional time series plots are available in Appendix D.  Chapter 5 will 
draw conclusions on these results and discuss recommendations for future research and 
study.  
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V.  Conclusion 
Review of Research Objectives 
This study started with two main objectives.  First, to determine if a mapping 
existed between acquisition reform implementation and a change in contract cost 
performance.  Second, if a mapping existed, to develop a rule of thumb to model this 
behavior.  The use of hypothesis tests assessed any statistical indications of differences in 
final mean contract cost overrun percentages of pre-reform and post-reform contracts in 
the Phase One and Phase Three analyses.  The hypotheses analyzed all Defense 
Department contracts and also analyzed breakouts of program phase and contract type to 
discern any differences.  The Phase Two analysis involved plotting the contract cost 
variance data over time to see any trends or changes in relation to acquisition reform 
events.  The results of all three phases meet the objectives stated above. 
Discussion of Results 
Phase One results indicated no statistically significant difference in the mean final 
cost overrun percentage of pre-reform contracts and post-reform contracts, utilizing       
31 December 1997 as the treatment date.  The results were consistent across the program 
phases and contract types.   
Phase Two produced interesting results.  In looking at the time plots of the 
contract cost variance percentages, there are noticeable performance changes.  These 
changes in performance coincide with acquisition reform events.  The consistency of 
these occurrences gives credence to the existence of a relationship between acquisition 
reform events and active contract cost performance.  However, these changes are not 
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statistically quantified.  The changes in cost variance percentage are based on a visual 
determination of the cost variance behavior in relationship to the acquisition reform 
timeline. 
Phase Three was an attempt to reestablish a treatment date with information 
obtained from Phase Two as well as information of internal DoD activities toward 
acquisition reform implementation.  Using a treatment date of 31 December 1994, the 
same hypotheses tested in Phase One were tested with new pre-reform and post-reform 
samples.  The results indicated no statistically significant difference between pre-reform 
and post-reform contract cost performance.  The results were consistent across program 
phases and contract types 
Conclusions  
The results of Phases One and Three indicate that acquisition reform events and 
initiatives have not significantly changed the final contract cost overrun percentage of 
completed contracts.  While this is statistically true, this is not an indication that 
acquisition reform is not achieving intended goals.  Any acquisition reform effects noted 
in initial program cost estimates and taken into account prior to initiating contracts would 
not be reflected in these results.  The only acquisition reform impacts noted here would 
be impacts to the way contracts are controlled and managed to completion.  The 
statistical tests indicate that cost performance, as reflected through earned value, is no 
different for post-reform contracts as compared to pre-reform contracts.  These 
conclusions are also based on the selection of 31 December 1997 and 31 December 1994 
as treatment dates for Phase One and Phase Three, respectively.   
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While the analysis of completed contracts indicates no change in performance, the 
Phase Two results tell a different story.  Phase Two analyzed active contracts, regardless 
of percent complete.  The plots indicate that active contract cost performance changes as 
a result of acquisition reform events.  There appears to be a relationship between 
acquisition reform events and an immediate change in cost performance.  However, 
without an in-depth analysis of each respective contract, this study cannot provide 
answers as to why such changes occurred and why they appear to be short- lived. 
  The results of this study are consistent with past empirical studies which 
analyzed contract cost performance following acquisition reform events.  Christensen and 
Templin found that post A-12 contracts performed better than pre A-12 contracts.  The 
difference in treatment dates and methodology employed account for the different results.  
Christensen and Templin utilized 31 December 1991 as the treatment date, while this 
study used dates 3 and 6 years later in this study.  The results of this study indicate that 
post A-12 (31 December 1991), completed contract cost performance has not changed, 
for better or worse.   
The results are also consistent with the Blueprint for Action report issued in 
February 2001.  Any failure to succeed and meet the goals of acquisition reform is not 
from a lack of good ideas.  For decades the same issues, problems and solutions have 
been exposed and offered by numerous commissions and panels (Druyun, 2001:41).  The 
report points out that while “progress has been made on some fronts, a lack of top-level 
priority has limited the progress made to date” (Druyun, 2001:41).  The push for 
transformation and the hard-hitting attitude of the Defense Department leadership is 
certainly encouraging and actions such as canceling the DoD 5000 series are indicative of 
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its importance.  However, unless this “change” movement is institutionalized by 
government acquisition and contractor personnel, history will repeat itself.   
Recommendations for Future Research   
 There are three areas of future research that should be considered.  First, the 
results of Phase Two should be explored in more detail.  Study of a few contracts that 
experienced a change in contract cost performance during times of acquisition reform 
events may uncover what caused these changes.  The question of “Are the changes from 
chance occurrences, or earned value and contract rebaselining activities, or by utilizing 
smart business practices and sound management?” needs to be answered.  Lessons 
learned from this analysis could be very beneficial to the acquisition community for 
incorporation into other programs and contracts.   
 Pilot programs are often mentioned when discussing acquisition reform success 
stories.  When analyzing the contracts in the DAES database associated with the 
acquisition pilot programs, the cost performance is favorable compared to the average.  It 
may be worthwhile to study and find the underlying cause of these contracts’ better than 
average cost performance to see if there are lessons learned to pass on to other programs 
as well.  The results of this study could also provide the Department of Defense with 
further evidence that pilot programs are successful and should be expanded. 
 Finally, an analysis of program cost growth using Selected Acquisition Report 
(SAR) data should be conducted.  This would provide a comparison to the conclusions of 
the Drezner, et al. study in 1993, to find if acquisition reform of the 1990’s has truly 
affected the cost growth of DoD programs.  The SAR analysis would uncover cost 
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growth or decline not reflected or evidenced in the DAES database, if it exists.  This type 
of analysis, coupled with this study, would provide a more complete answer to whether or 
not acquisition reform activities in the 1990’s has affected program cost growth. 
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Appendix A.  DSMC Earned Value Management Gold Card 
 
TO COMPLETE PERFORMANCE INDEX (TCPI)
TCPI
WORK REMAINING
COST REMAINING
= BAC – BCWP CUM
EAC – ACWP CUM(EAC)
=
Defense Systems Management College
Earned Value Management Gold Card
Management Reserve TAB
Cost 
Variance
Schedule Variance
ACWP
BCWP
BCWS
$
EAC
Time
Now
Completion 
Date
PMB
• Schedule Variance SV = BCWP – BCWS
• Cost Variance                     CV   = BCWP – ACWP 
BCWP BCWS
BCWP ACWP
VARIANCES (Favorable is positive, Unfavorable is negative)
CV % = CV BCWP
SV % = SV BCWS
• Variance at Completion VAC   = BAC – EAC
ESTIMATE AT COMPLETION (EAC = ACWP + Estimate for Remaining Work)
EAC  CPI = CPI CUM
BAC • EACComposite = ACWP CUM   + 
BAC – BCWP CUM
(CPI CUM) • (SPI CUM)
• Cost Efficiency
• Schedule Efficiency
PERFORMANCE INDICES
=
BAC
BCWP CUM
= ACWP CUM 
BAC
OVERALL STATUS
• Percent Complete
• Percent Spent
CPI   =
SPI   =
(Favorable is > 1.0, Unfavorable is < 1.0)_
BAC
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+ OVERRUN
TERMINOLOGY
NCC – Negotiated Contract Cost Contract price less profit / fee
AUW – Authorized Unpriced Work          Work authorized to start, not yet negotiated
CBB – Contract Budget Base Sum of NCCand AUW
OTB – Over Target Baseline Sum of CBBand recognized overrun
TAB – Total Allocated Budget Sum of all contract budgets - NCC,CBBor 0TB ( includes MR )
BAC – Budget At Completion Cumulative BCWS  - total end point of PMB ( excludes MR )
PMB – Performance Measurement         Contract time-phased, budgeted work plan ( excludes MR )
Baseline
MR – Management Reserve Contractor PM’s Contingency budget
UB – Undistributed Budget Broadly defined activities not yet distributed to CAs
CA – Control Account Contractor key management control point - CWBS element 
WP – Work Package Near-term, detail-planned activities within a CA
PP – Planning Package Far-term CA activities not yet defined into detail Work Packages
BCWS– Budgeted Cost for Work Scheduled   Value of work scheduled -- PLAN
BCWP– Budgeted Cost for Work Performed   Value of work completed -- EARNED VALUE
ACWP– Actual Cost of Work Performed      Cost of work completed -- ACTUAL COSTS INCURRED
EAC – Estimate At Completion Estimate of total contract costs 
EVM POLICY (DOD 5000.2-R)
ALTERNATIVE EV MANAGEMENT APPLICATIONS
LEVEL 1.  EVMS Industry Standards Management Application
Contractor management system certified as meeting Industry Standards
• Required for non-FFPcontract exceeding $73M RDT&E or $315M in procurement (CY00$).
•  PM may apply to contracts below-threshold —consider benefits, risk and criticality.
• Contractor must establish, maintain, and use a system that meetsthe the 32 Industry Standards.
• Cost Performance Report (CPR) delivered as aCDRLitem.
• 5 Formats (WBS, Organization, Baseline, Staffing, and Explanations)
LEVEL 2.  C/SSRManagement Application
Contractor Management system not certified
• Required for non-FFPcontract exceeding $6.3M (CY00$)  and 12 months in length.
•’Reasonably objective’ EV methods acceptable,  traceability at higher level (CA vs WP)
•The CPR or the  Cost/Schedule Status Report (C/SSR) delivered as aCDRLitem.
EVMHome Page —http://www.acq.osd.mil/pm/
DSMC EV E-Mail Address —EVM@DSMC.DSM.MIL
DSMC EV Phone No. —(703) 805–2848/2968 (DSN655) 
PMB Management Reserve
Control Accounts Undistributed Budget
Contract Price
Work Packages Planning Packages
Profit / Fee
= OTB
= CBB
+ AUW
NCC
TAB
June 2000
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Appendix B. Normal Probability Plots 
 
Phase One – All DoD Contracts 
   
 
 
Phase One – Development Phase Contracts 
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Phase One – Production Phase Contracts 
  
 
 
Phase One – Cost Plus Type Contracts 
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Phase One – Fixed Price Type Contracts 
     
 
 
Phase Three –All DoD Contracts 
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Phase Three – Development Phase Contracts 
    
 
 
Phase Three – Production Phase Contracts 
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Phase Three – Cost Plus Type Contracts 
   
 
 
Phase Three – Fixed Price Type Contracts 
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Appendix C. Hypothesis Sensitivity Results 
Phase One Hypothesis Test Results (No OTB) 
All DoD Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.0033 6.1755
Std Error 1.770 1.807
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 5159.5 -0.723 2.3354
P-value 0.5151 0.4711 0.1286
Development Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 14.2662 6.7387
Std Error 2.755 2.328
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 853 1.8639 18.3603
P-value 0.1772 0.0718 <.0001
Production Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 6.3242 7.1845
Std Error 2.929 3.541
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 767 0.187 1.3183
P-value 0.2894 0.8521 0.2553
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 5.2030 5.1440
Std Error 2.102 1.734
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 1148 0.0193 8.2747
P-value 0.1891 0.9847 0.0042
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 9.6022 9.4828
Std Error 3.360 4.177
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 560 -0.022 0.8982
P-value 0.2646 0.9823 0.3475
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Phase One Hypothesis Test Results (Pre/Trans/Post) 
All DoD Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.2522 6.2733 6.0043
Sample Size 109 86 9
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 1.2287 0.4771 1.4847
P-value 0.541 0.6213 0.2291
Development Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 11.0208 7.0036 7.9658
Sample Size 36 40 4
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 0.6562 0.7901 6.3674
P-value 0.7203 0.4792 0.0028
Production Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.1880 6.9401 5.4793
Sample Size 61 30 4
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 3.165 0.0851 0.3518
P-value 0.2055 0.9184 0.7044
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 5.1422 5.6923 3.9067
Sample Size 40 54 6
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 2.0025 0.481 4.3012
P-value 0.3674 0.624 0.0162
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.6052 8.6842 7.2758
Sample Size 59 24 5
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 2.6915 0.0157 1.3983
P-value 0.2603 0.9844 0.2526
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Phase One Hypothesis Test Results (No OTB & Pre/Trans/Post) 
All DoD Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.0033 6.2000 6.0043
Sample Size 75 63 9
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 0.7701 0.2599 1.2378
P-value 0.6804 0.7715 0.2931
Development Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 14.2662 6.5804 7.9658
Sample Size 25 31 4
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 2.3459 1.6622 9.2635
P-value 0.3095 0.234 0.0003
Production Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 6.3242 7.4946 5.4793
Sample Size 38 22 4
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 1.355 0.038 0.8105
P-value 0.5079 0.9627 0.4494
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 5.2030 5.3250 3.9067
Sample Size 32 41 6
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 1.9324 0.2798 5.0715
P-value 0.3805 0.7581 0.0086
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 9.6022 10.1319 7.2758
Sample Size 34 17 5
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 1.5357 0.0406 0.8603
P-value 0.464 0.9603 0.4288
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Phase Three Hypothesis Test Results (No OTB) 
All DoD Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 9.2005 6.6208
Std Error 1.606 1.828
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 9068.5 -1.06 1.5725
P-value 0.2622 0.2903 0.2113
Development Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 12.8949 11.5267
Std Error 3.293 2.852
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 886.5 -0.314 0.0049
P-value 0.7599 0.7545 0.9441
Production Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.5848 3.3422
Std Error 2.119 3.184
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 1770 -1.371 3.8944
P-value 0.1371 0.1731 0.0509
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 7.1253 5.6841
Std Error 3.040 2.062
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 895.5 -0.392 0.0137
P-value 0.6013 0.696 0.9072
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-reform Post-Reform
Mean FO% 10.7687 6.8134
Std Error 2.106 3.647
Test Results Mann-Whitney U Two-Sample t Levene
Test Statistic (Ws) 1471 -0.939 1.0090
P-value 0.1514 0.3496 0.3173
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Phase Three Hypothesis Test Results (Pre/Trans/Post) 
All DoD Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 9.3375 7.6530 4.7497
Sample Size 156 106 10
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 5.3919 0.5866 0.6118
P-value 0.0675 0.5569 0.5431
Development Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 12.0260 11.5770 -0.2960
Sample Size 42 41 3
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 4.4095 0.8477 1.7510
P-value 0.1103 0.4321 0.1800
Production Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.9002 5.5594 10.6196
Sample Size 97 47 5
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 1.3977 0.5922 2.0189
P-value 0.4971 0.5544 0.1365
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.4189 5.6881 7.9039
Sample Size 32 50 7
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 1.593 0.3818 0.8778
P-value 0.4509 0.6838 0.4194
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 10.5540 7.3429 -1.8150
Sample Size 114 44 2
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 3.9158 0.9573 1.3362
P-value 0.1412 0.3862 0.2658
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Phase Three Hypothesis Test Results (No OTB & Pre/Trans/Post) 
All DoD Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 9.2005 6.8518 4.7497
Sample Size 118 81 10
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 4.4352 0.624 0.8724
P-value 0.1089 0.5368 0.4195
Development Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 12.8950 12.6015 -0.2960
Sample Size 27 33 3
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 4.2747 0.8383 1.6368
P-value 0.118 0.4375 0.2032
Production Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 8.5848 2.1293 10.6196
Sample Size 79 30 5
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 2.2196 2.9231 3.6008
P-value 0.3296 0.0982 0.0305
Cost Plus Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 7.1253 5.3227 7.9039
Sample Size 23 43 7
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 0.8057 0.1694 0.6162
P-value 0.6684 0.8445 0.5429
Fixed Price Contracts
Pre-Reform Transitional Post-Reform
Mean FO% 10.7690 7.4525 -1.8150
Sample Size 87 27 2
Test Results Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA Levene
Test Statistic 3.5802 0.6449 0.8090
P-value 0.1669 0.5266 0.4478  
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Appendix D. Phase Two Time Series Plots 
Development Phase Contracts 
 
Production Phase Contracts 
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Cost Plus Type Contracts 
 
Fixed Price Type Contracts 
 
   
98 
Appendix E.  DAES Data 
Phase One Data 
Date CV CO % ACWP BCWP BAC Comp % OTB Trans. Type Phase
1/25/1994 -2.00 -2.46% 79.3 81.3 40.7 199.75%Yes FP Dev
1/25/1994 1.40 1.30% 109.4 108 108.8 99.26%Yes FP Prod
1/25/1994 6.70 3.86% 180.1 173.4 200.1 86.66%No FP
3/25/1994 55.70 66.87% 139 83.3 83.8 99.40%No FP Prod
4/25/1994 2.70 0.27% 1004 1001.3 1019.4 98.22%No CP Prod
4/25/1994 64.90 14.59% 509.8 444.9 368.5 120.73%Yes FP Prod
4/25/1994 4.60 4.53% 106.2 101.6 106.2 95.67%No FP Prod
5/25/1994 16.70 3.78% 458.8 442.1 182.4 242.38%Yes CP Dev
5/25/1994 2.90 15.76% 21.3 18.4 14.7 125.17%Yes CP Dev
5/25/1994 0.90 0.08% 1088.5 1087.6 873.9 124.45%Yes FP Dev
7/25/1994 12.50 17.34% 84.6 72.1 76.5 94.25%No CP Dev
7/25/1994 309.20 27.33% 1440.6 1131.4 1158.4 97.67%Yes FP Prod
7/25/1994 27.60 4.54% 635.1 607.5 787 77.19%Yes FP Prod
7/25/1994 104.60 13.14% 900.9 796.3 998.8 79.73%No FP Prod
8/25/1994 11.90 18.28% 77 65.1 49 132.86%Yes FP Prod
8/25/1994 -11.70 -3.88% 289.9 301.6 309.3 97.51%No FP Prod
8/25/1994 -13.40 -8.60% 142.4 155.8 163.8 95.12%No FP Prod
8/25/1994 76.50 11.86% 721.6 645.1 551.3 117.01%Yes FP Prod
9/25/1994 -7.00 -5.75% 114.8 121.8 134 90.90%No CP Prod
9/25/1994 -1.70 -1.53% 109.6 111.3 114.8 96.95%No FP Prod
10/25/1994 188.70 19.69% 1147 958.3 897.3 106.80%Yes FP Prod
10/25/1994 85.50 9.51% 984.5 899 945.3 95.10%No FP Prod
10/25/1994 36.50 12.47% 329.1 292.6 248.9 117.56%Yes FP Prod
11/25/1994 -25.80 -5.52% 441.7 467.5 491 95.21%Yes FP Prod
12/25/1994 36.50 5.02% 764 727.5 756.1 96.22%No FP Prod
12/25/1994 16.00 10.70% 165.5 149.5 180.8 82.69%No FP Prod
12/25/1994 127.60 14.73% 993.6 866 881 98.30%No FP Prod
12/25/1994 88.10 16.01% 638.5 550.4 611.6 89.99%No FP Prod
12/25/1994 106.40 7.75% 1478.5 1372.1 1447.7 94.78%No FP Prod
12/25/1994 -1.00 -0.44% 224.4 225.4 215.1 104.79%Yes CP Dev
1/25/1995 5.20 0.49% 1067.7 1062.5 1095.3 97.01%No CP Prod
2/25/1995 -2.50 -3.20% 75.7 78.2 86.1 90.82%No CP Dev
2/25/1995 41.70 5.39% 816 774.3 853.8 90.69%No FP Prod
3/25/1995 1.70 3.46% 50.9 49.2 44.6 110.31%Yes CP Dev
3/25/1995 51.50 11.47% 500.4 448.9 287.8 155.98%Yes FP Prod
3/25/1995 1.20 1.31% 93.1 91.9 117.3 78.35%No FP Prod
4/25/1995 -3.10 -15.90% 16.4 19.5 19.5 100.00%No CP Mix
4/25/1995 5.70 3.53% 167.1 161.4 165.7 97.40%No FP Mix
4/25/1995 22.30 8.23% 293.1 270.8 228 118.77%Yes FP Prod
5/25/1995 2.70 0.96% 282.5 279.8 285.2 98.11%No CP Dev
6/25/1995 27.20 37.94% 98.9 71.7 72.8 98.49%No Hybrid Dev
6/25/1995 194.60 40.70% 672.7 478.1 485.5 98.48%No CP Dev
7/25/1995 30.30 2.21% 1400.9 1370.6 1406.1 97.48%No FP Prod
7/25/1995 0.30 0.29% 102.2 101.9 102.7 99.22%No FP Prod  
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8/25/1995 11.80 10.63% 122.8 111 65.8 168.69%Yes FP Prod
8/25/1995 11.40 19.16% 70.9 59.5 66.6 89.34%No FP Prod
8/25/1995 17.70 10.66% 183.8 166.1 127.7 130.07%Yes CP Dev
8/25/1995 1.90 2.07% 93.7 91.8 93.8 97.87%No CP Dev
9/25/1995 -0.10 -0.35% 28.7 28.8 29 99.31%No CP Dev
9/25/1995 1.80 3.74% 49.9 48.1 34.3 140.23%Yes CP Dev
9/25/1995 2.70 1.09% 250.6 247.9 264.6 93.69%No FP Prod
10/25/1995 114.10 30.28% 490.9 376.8 386.3 97.54%No CP Dev
10/25/1995 29.10 10.28% 312.3 283.2 236.4 119.80%Yes FP Prod
10/25/1995 0.70 3.18% 22.7 22 24.2 90.91%No CP Dev
10/25/1995 -7.90 -9.23% 77.7 85.6 89.3 95.86%No CP Dev
11/25/1995 -4.40 -3.83% 110.6 115 116.1 99.05%No Hybrid Prod
11/25/1995 -36.00 -7.04% 475.2 511.2 526.8 97.04%No FP Prod
11/25/1995 -2.60 -1.82% 140.3 142.9 155.9 91.66%No CP
12/25/1995 72.60 46.60% 228.4 155.8 157.8 98.73%No FP Dev
1/25/1996 2972.40 57.36% 8154.7 5182.3 5547.9 93.41%No FP Dev
2/25/1996 26.10 31.11% 110 83.9 89 94.27%No CP Dev
3/25/1996 7.50 12.93% 65.5 58 57.6 100.69%Yes FP Prod
4/25/1996 12.10 10.82% 123.9 111.8 118.9 94.03%No CP Dev
4/25/1996 -11.50 -1.80% 628.5 640 659.5 97.04%No CP Prod
4/25/1996 52.10 8.86% 640.1 588 632 93.04%No Hybrid Prod
4/25/1996 33.00 35.68% 125.5 92.5 95.8 96.56%No Hybrid Dev
5/25/1996 0.70 0.17% 418.5 417.8 424.1 98.51%No CP Dev
5/25/1996 -83.30 -7.10% 1089.4 1172.7 1099.8 106.63%Yes FP Prod
5/25/1996 42.50 4.39% 1009.6 967.1 965.9 100.12%Yes FP Prod
6/25/1996 35.50 3.28% 1118.6 1083.1 953 113.65%Yes FP Dev
6/25/1996 -0.40 -0.70% 56.8 57.2 58.3 98.11%No CP Prod
6/25/1996 -4.50 -0.84% 531.1 535.6 563 95.13%No FP Prod
6/25/1996 -1.20 -2.88% 40.4 41.6 43.8 94.98%No CP Training
7/25/1996 1.30 7.93% 17.7 16.4 17.1 95.91%No Hybrid Dev
7/25/1996 -3.70 -0.27% 1382.7 1386.4 1421.2 97.55%No FP Prod
7/25/1996 474.60 5.12% 9751.9 9277.3 10514.3 88.24%No FP Mix
8/25/1996 13.90 1.96% 722.8 708.9 735.3 96.41%Yes CP Dev
9/25/1996 0.00 0.00% 60.9 60.9 68.5 88.91%No CP Dev
10/25/1996 5.00 5.39% 97.7 92.7 97.6 94.98%No CP Dev
10/25/1996 0.20 0.26% 77.1 76.9 77.2 99.61%No CP Dev
11/25/1996 10.50 11.39% 102.7 92.2 92 100.22%No Mix
11/25/1996 -63.50 -3.18% 1936.4 1999.9 1911 104.65%Yes FP Prod
12/25/1996 3.40 14.05% 27.6 24.2 24.1 100.41%No CP Mix
12/25/1996 56.00 0.28% 19765.1 19709.1 10014.8 196.80%Yes CP Dev
12/25/1996 -67.00 -0.61% 10895.7 10962.7 11779.5 93.07%Yes FP Prod
1/25/1997 11.90 9.88% 132.3 120.4 127.8 94.21%No CP Dev
2/25/1997 8.10 7.26% 119.6 111.5 104.6 106.60%Yes FP Prod
2/25/1997 26.60 18.22% 172.6 146 149.6 97.59%No CP Dev
2/25/1997 69.60 78.82% 157.9 88.3 80.2 110.10%Yes Hybrid Prod
4/25/1997 -5.60 -1.13% 488.9 494.5 520.6 94.99%No CP Prod
5/25/1997 15.70 8.54% 199.6 183.9 189.3 97.15%No FP Prod
5/25/1997 -31.90 -6.70% 444.4 476.3 512.7 92.90%No FP Prod
5/25/1997 1.00 0.13% 767.8 766.8 706.2 108.58%Yes FP Prod
6/25/1997 12.80 11.55% 123.6 110.8 122.5 90.45%No FP Dev  
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7/25/1997 87.60 15.61% 648.6 561 561 100.00%No FP Prod
7/25/1997 26.10 8.67% 327.1 301 329.1 91.46%No FP Prod
8/25/1997 0.80 2.05% 39.9 39.1 39.3 99.49%No CP Mix
8/25/1997 -3.10 -4.47% 66.3 69.4 70 99.14%No CP Mix
8/25/1997 -19.60 -18.63% 85.6 105.2 109.8 95.81%No CP Dev
8/25/1997 -3.80 -4.09% 89.2 93 94.8 98.10%No FP Prod
8/26/1997 9.90 5.26% 198.1 188.2 202 93.17%No Prod
9/25/1997 225.50 20.11% 1346.6 1121.1 1060.4 105.72%Yes FP Prod
10/25/1997 3.90 2.20% 180.8 176.9 228.3 77.49%No Hybrid Prod
10/25/1997 -57.40 -11.92% 424 481.4 500.6 96.16%No CP Mix
11/25/1997 49.70 19.66% 302.5 252.8 255.6 98.90%No FP Dev
11/25/1997 1.00 1.22% 83.1 82.1 85.9 95.58%No FP Dev
11/25/1997 2.70 1.84% 149.7 147 157 93.63%No Hybrid Prod
11/25/1997 13.00 57.02% 35.8 22.8 26.3 86.69%No CP Prod
12/25/1997 9.60 1.24% 786.4 776.8 676.5 114.83%Yes FP Prod
1/25/98 -0.1 -0.34% 29.4 29.5 29.6 99.66%No Yes CP Dev
1/25/98 181.3 28.47% 818.2 636.9 632.9 100.63%Yes Yes FP Prod
2/25/98 -0.9 -2.72% 32.2 33.1 41.7 79.38%No Yes CP Dev
3/25/98 18.3 30.65% 78 59.7 60.9 98.03%Yes Yes CP Dev
3/25/98 20.2 17.26% 137.2 117 120.2 97.34%No Yes CP Dev
4/25/98 6.9 4.04% 177.5 170.6 219.2 77.83%No Yes CP Prod
4/25/98 -19.6 -5.71% 323.5 343.1 382.2 89.77%No Yes CP Prod
5/25/98 2.4 5.17% 48.8 46.4 46.5 99.78%No Yes CP Dev
5/25/98 9.5 4.78% 208.2 198.7 233.9 84.95%Yes Yes CP Dev
5/25/98 6.8 3.91% 180.7 173.9 219.3 79.30%No Yes CP
7/25/98 7.4 13.03% 64.2 56.8 76.1 74.64%No Yes CP Dev
7/25/98 25.1 5.96% 446.5 421.4 442.8 95.17%No Yes CP Dev
7/25/98 8.2 14.94% 63.1 54.9 55.5 98.92%No Yes CP Dev
8/25/98 -0.2 -2.13% 9.2 9.4 10.9 86.24%No Yes Mix Prod
8/25/98 -3.3 -0.61% 534.9 538.2 552.4 97.43%No Yes FP Prod
9/25/98 6 9.71% 67.8 61.8 65.1 94.93%No Yes Mix Dev
9/25/98 0.9 0.92% 99.2 98.3 113.7 86.46%No Yes CP Dev
9/25/98 -7.3 -3.50% 201.5 208.8 223.8 93.30%No Yes CP Planning
9/25/98 109.3 13.50% 919 809.7 843.9 95.95%Yes Yes FP Prod
10/25/98 112 3.55% 3267.6 3155.6 3188.5 98.97%No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 65.1 12.27% 595.7 530.6 534.5 99.27%No Yes CP Dev
11/25/98 4.1 0.83% 498.1 494 421.9 117.09%Yes Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 -5.7 -2.57% 215.8 221.5 243 91.15%No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 0.6 0.46% 131.9 131.3 129.4 101.47%No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 22.3 9.20% 264.8 242.5 246.8 98.26%No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 11.9 9.57% 136.3 124.4 131.5 94.60%No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 -6.3 -2.45% 250.5 256.8 283.7 90.52%No Yes FP Prod
2/25/99 31.9 8.40% 411.6 379.7 386.9 98.14%No Yes CP Dev
2/25/99 -11.4 -1.44% 781.9 793.3 683.1 116.13%Yes Yes FP Prod
4/25/99 7.7 4.56% 176.7 169 132.4 127.64%Yes Yes CP PDRR
4/25/99 22.9 7.08% 346.3 323.4 356.9 90.61%No Yes CP PDRR
4/25/99 4.6 1.29% 361.9 357.3 336.3 106.24%Yes Yes CP PDRR
4/25/99 0 0.00% 262.2 262.2 319.7 82.01%No Yes CP PDRR
4/25/99 74.8 13.35% 635.3 560.5 661.3 84.76%No Yes CP PDRR
5/25/99 19.7 6.23% 335.7 316 300.8 105.05%Yes Yes CP Dev  
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6/25/99 0 0.00% 276.3 276.3 249.5 110.74%Yes Yes CP Dev
7/25/99 5.7 1.49% 388.2 382.5 388.3 98.51%No Yes CP Dev
8/25/99 0.1 0.10% 102.7 102.6 106.7 96.16%No Yes Mix Dev
10/25/99 5.7 4.23% 140.6 134.9 149.4 90.29%No Yes CP PDRR
11/25/99 0.3 0.26% 114.3 114 118.4 96.28%No Yes CP Dev
11/25/99 -0.2 -0.50% 39.9 40.1 40.8 98.28%No Yes CP Dev
12/25/99 23.1 9.44% 267.7 244.6 244.7 99.96%Yes Yes CP Dev
2/25/00 -0.4 -0.36% 110.3 110.7 130.6 84.76%No Yes CP Dev
2/25/00 8.6 0.95% 913.2 904.6 907.9 99.64%No Yes CP PDRR
2/25/00 1.1 1.87% 59.9 58.8 58.7 100.17%No Yes CP
3/25/00 5.1 1.96% 265.8 260.7 289.9 89.93%No Yes CP Dev
3/25/00 0.1 0.26% 38.7 38.6 45.4 85.02%No NO FP Prod
4/25/00 -7.7 -3.71% 199.8 207.5 214.3 96.83%No Yes FP Prod
5/25/00 0.8 3.05% 27 26.2 26.7 98.13%No Yes CP Dev
5/25/00 67.8 18.28% 438.7 370.9 407.5 91.02%No Yes CP Dev
6/25/00 61.9 3.02% 2114 2052.1 1420 144.51%Yes Yes CP Dev
7/25/00 -1.9 -0.07% 2618.2 2620.1 3413.3 76.76%Yes Yes CP DEM/VAL
7/25/00 28.2 38.37% 101.7 73.5 77.1 95.33%No Yes CP Dev
7/25/00 29.2 11.64% 280 250.8 254.5 98.55%No Yes CP Dev
8/25/00 6.2 6.70% 98.7 92.5 76.9 120.29%Yes Yes CP Dev
8/25/00 -21.8 -2.90% 730.9 752.7 668.9 112.53%Yes Yes FP Prod
8/25/00 -3.5 -4.87% 68.3 71.8 72.1 99.58%No Yes FP Prod
9/25/00 2.6 10.20% 28.1 25.5 25.8 98.84%No NO CP Dev
9/25/00 -38.1 -5.80% 618.8 656.9 689.5 95.27%No Yes FP Prod
9/25/00 0.7 1.26% 56.1 55.4 58.3 95.03%No Yes CP
9/25/00 4.5 7.89% 61.5 57 61.2 93.14%No Yes CP
11/25/00 0 0.00% 40.8 40.8 40.8 100.00%No Yes CP Dev
11/25/00 -11.6 -3.90% 285.9 297.5 314.6 94.56%No Yes FP Prod
11/25/00 161.4 18.81% 1019.4 858 879.5 97.56%No Yes FP Prod
1/25/01 34.6 1.02% 3441.1 3406.5 3420.8 99.58%No Yes CP Dev
1/25/01 62.8 9.30% 738.1 675.3 674.8 100.07%Yes Yes CP Dev
1/25/01 -8.2 -0.54% 1518.1 1526.3 1567.4 97.38%No Yes CP Prod
1/25/01 1.2 0.54% 223.3 222.1 225.3 98.58%No NO CP Prod
1/25/01 -63 -4.85% 1235.3 1298.3 1357 95.67%No Yes FP Prod
2/25/01 10.1 6.12% 175.2 165.1 168.4 98.04%No Yes CP Dev
2/25/01 -4.8 -0.97% 488.3 493.1 464.1 106.25%Yes Yes FP Prod
2/25/01 10 24.63% 50.6 40.6 44.7 90.83%No NO FP Prod
2/25/01 123.8 14.53% 975.9 852.1 924.1 92.21%No Yes FP Prod
4/25/01 14.2 7.14% 213 198.8 160.5 123.86%Yes Yes CP Prod
4/25/01 14.9 51.92% 43.6 28.7 30.8 93.18%No Yes FP Prod
4/25/01 16 94.67% 32.9 16.9 18.5 91.35%No Yes FP Prod
5/25/01 0 0.00% 71.2 71.2 85.3 83.47%No Yes CP Dev
5/25/01 6.2 3.94% 163.5 157.3 166.6 94.42%No Yes CP Dev
7/25/01 -3.5 -0.75% 462.3 465.8 507.5 91.78%No Yes CP Closure
7/25/01 6.1 1.03% 597.1 591 616.7 95.83%No NO FP Prod
7/25/01 -0.8 -1.31% 60.2 61 55.6 109.71%Yes Yes FP Prod
8/25/01 -2.7 -1.92% 137.8 140.5 155.7 90.24%No Yes CP Dev
8/25/01 10.6 14.74% 82.5 71.9 73.9 97.29%No NO FP Dev
9/25/01 -71.2 -2.12% 3287.4 3358.6 3524.2 95.30%No Yes CP Dev
9/25/01 39.9 12.36% 362.8 322.9 350.3 92.18%No Yes CP PDRR  
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9/25/01 -6.7 -3.27% 198.5 205.2 209.6 97.90%No Yes CP Phase II
10/25/01 -65.6 -4.29% 1465.1 1530.7 1602.6 95.51%No NO FP Prod
11/25/01 52.4 6.02% 922.9 870.5 672.8 129.38%Yes Yes CP Dev
11/25/01 15.1 12.73% 133.7 118.6 138.8 85.45%No Yes CP Dev
11/25/01 0.3 2.13% 14.4 14.1 16.1 87.58%No NO CP Dev
11/25/01 2.7 4.80% 59 56.3 66.2 85.05%No NO CP Dev
11/25/01 89.6 20.48% 527.2 437.6 514.3 85.09%No Yes CP Dev
11/25/01 -6.2 -3.03% 198.5 204.7 220.7 92.75%No Yes Mix Prod
12/25/01 -14.7 -1.68% 860.1 874.8 1161.7 75.30%No Yes FP Prod
12/25/01 3.9 4.87% 84 80.1 82.7 96.86%No Yes Mix Dev  
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Phase Three Data 
Date CV CO % ACWP BCWP BAC Comp % OTB Trans. Type Phase
1/17/91 4.1 2.69% 156.5 152.4 144.5 105.47% No CP DEV
1/25/91 3.1 3.52% 91.1 88 28.2 312.06% Yes FP DEV
2/25/91 16.8 10.20% 181.5 164.7 165.2 99.70% No FP DEV
2/25/91 41.5 6.27% 703.1 661.6 666.1 99.32% No CP DEV
2/25/91 1.3 1.51% 87.6 86.3 87.6 98.52% No FP DEV
3/25/91 28.5 18.45% 183 154.5 156.4 98.79% No FP Prod
3/25/91 -16.5 -3.82% 415.3 431.8 469.3 92.01% No Mix Prod
3/25/91 7.2 4.45% 169.1 161.9 168.7 95.97% No CP Prod
3/25/91 -1.3 -1.61% 79.4 80.7 88.2 91.50% No FP Prod
4/25/91 3.2 3.81% 87.1 83.9 89.1 94.16% No FP DEV/PROD
4/25/91 0 0.00% 85.5 85.5 94.6 90.38% No CP DEV
4/25/91 94.5 25.27% 468.5 374 382.9 97.68% No CP DEV
4/25/91 6.1 17.09% 41.8 35.7 37.5 95.20% No FP Prod
5/25/91 -56.1 -13.66% 354.7 410.8 470 87.40% No FP
5/25/91 55.7 7.21% 828.7 773 670.8 115.24% Yes FP
6/25/91 3.2 3.70% 89.7 86.5 88.8 97.41% No FP DEV
6/25/91 2.5 0.89% 282.4 279.9 290.2 96.45% No FP DEV
6/25/91 -0.6 -1.31% 45.1 45.7 47.9 95.41% Yes FP DEV
6/25/91 6.5 4.59% 148.1 141.6 148.1 95.61% No FP Prod
6/25/91 -10.4 -12.67% 71.7 82.1 99.5 82.51% No Mix Prod
7/10/91 0 0.00% 27668 27668 10299 268.65% Yes
7/25/91 1.8 1.74% 105.5 103.7 104.4 99.33% No FP Devel/Prod
7/25/91 44.8 15.07% 342.1 297.3 303.8 97.86% No CP DEV
7/25/91 32.2 34.70% 125 92.8 99.4 93.36% No FP Prod
7/25/91 50.5 18.94% 317.1 266.6 283.5 94.04% No FP Prod
7/25/91 14.7 2.08% 721.4 706.7 730.4 96.76% No FP Prod
7/25/91 13.5 7.40% 195.9 182.4 194 94.02% No FP Prod
8/25/91 14 24.65% 70.8 56.8 49.2 115.45% Yes FP Prod
8/25/91 8.2 9.11% 98.2 90 90 100.00% No FP DEV
9/25/91 7.9 2.55% 317.4 309.5 344.2 89.92% Yes CP DEV
9/25/91 38.1 16.49% 269.1 231 306.2 75.44% No FP DEV
9/25/91 23.1 5.88% 416.1 393 246.7 159.30% Yes FP DEV
9/25/91 -3.8 -3.97% 91.8 95.6 95.5 100.10% No FP Prod
10/25/91 -15.8 -2.88% 532.3 548.1 559.9 97.89% No CP Prod
10/25/91 2.5 6.91% 38.7 36.2 41.8 86.60% No FP Prod
10/25/91 32.1 4.01% 832 799.9 828.1 96.59% No FP Prod
11/25/91 13.6 9.41% 158.2 144.6 151.6 95.38% No FP Prod
11/25/91 2.7 2.60% 106.4 103.7 108.8 95.31% No FP Prod
12/25/91 5.9 1.46% 410.5 404.6 409 98.92% No FP DEV
12/25/91 0.4 0.24% 169.3 168.9 171.8 98.31% No FP DEV
12/25/91 71.6 37.82% 260.9 189.3 190.8 99.21% No FP Prod
12/25/91 35.2 21.18% 201.4 166.2 175.1 94.92% No FP Prod
1/25/92 11.9 18.62% 75.8 63.9 66.1 96.67% No FP DEV
1/25/92 9.5 15.63% 70.3 60.8 65.9 92.26% No Mix DEV
1/25/92 -5.7 -7.30% 72.4 78.1 79.2 98.61% No FP Prod
1/25/92 52.9 9.13% 632.4 579.5 589.3 98.34% No FP Prod
1/25/92 7.3 1.80% 412.8 405.5 445.8 90.96% No FP QT  
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1/25/92 -5.1 -3.66% 134.3 139.4 140.3 99.36% No CP DEV
2/25/92 176.5 38.09% 639.9 463.4 424.1 109.27% Yes FP DEV
2/25/92 28.4 25.75% 138.7 110.3 114.5 96.33% No FP Prod
2/25/92 2.4 1.10% 219.6 217.2 159.3 136.35% Yes FP
2/25/92 97.3 19.48% 596.7 499.4 384.8 129.78% Yes FP
3/25/92 13.2 12.54% 118.5 105.3 127.9 82.33% No FP DEV
3/25/92 -3.1 -0.35% 872.4 875.5 917.8 95.39% No CP DEV
3/25/92 72.2 29.77% 314.7 242.5 247.6 97.94% No FP Prod
3/25/92 14.9 5.89% 268 253.1 264.5 95.69% No FP Prod
3/25/92 5.2 8.39% 67.2 62 62.1 99.84% No FP Prod
4/15/92 54 45.26% 173.3 119.3 126.8 94.09% No FP Prod
4/25/92 311.6 26.56% 1484.8 1173.2 1182.2 99.24% No FP Prod
4/25/92 75.2 32.33% 307.8 232.6 175.6 132.46% Yes CP DEV
5/25/92 1.4 1.15% 123.6 122.2 118.5 103.12% Yes CP DEM/VAL
5/25/92 18.5 17.18% 126.2 107.7 124.7 86.37% No CP DEM/VAL
5/25/92 25.1 16.98% 172.9 147.8 149.5 98.86% No FP Prod
5/25/92 -1.4 -0.40% 348.4 349.8 376.1 93.01% No FP Prod
5/25/92 23 11.84% 217.2 194.2 201.5 96.38% No FP Prod
5/25/92 -31.6 -5.23% 572.9 604.5 620.1 97.48% No FP Prod
5/25/92 15.2 6.98% 233.1 217.9 261.7 83.26% No CP SDS
5/25/92 57.7 12.09% 535.1 477.4 508.5 93.88% No FP
6/6/92 -0.6 -0.49% 122.4 123 143.5 85.71% No CP
6/25/92 28.1 7.40% 408 379.9 385.7 98.50% No FP Prod
6/25/92 0.5 0.25% 204.4 203.9 224.8 90.70% No CP DEV
7/25/92 4.1 0.50% 822.9 818.8 837.6 97.76% No CP Prod
7/25/92 -40.2 -3.20% 1216.2 1256.4 1194.5 105.18% Yes FP Prod
8/25/92 -12 -12.26% 85.9 97.9 126.8 77.21% No FP Prod
9/25/92 40.1 47.74% 124.1 84 85.8 97.90% No FP Prod
9/25/92 -2 -1.69% 116.1 118.1 137.7 85.77% No Mix Prod
10/25/92 1 0.86% 117.9 116.9 126.4 92.48% No FP Mix
10/25/92 24.3 62.47% 63.2 38.9 41.3 94.19% No FP DEV
10/25/92 155.5 8.73% 1936.1 1780.6 1529.7 116.40% Yes FP DEV
10/25/92 1.4 1.22% 116.4 115 119.1 96.56% No FP Prod
11/1/92 -9.3 -7.53% 114.2 123.5 130.5 94.64% No Mix Prod
11/25/92 14.7 7.77% 203.8 189.1 232.8 81.23% No FP Prod
11/25/92 4.4 2.31% 194.6 190.2 194.9 97.59% No FP Prod
11/25/92 18.8 30.08% 81.3 62.5 66.3 94.27% No FP DEV
12/25/92 2.9 2.20% 135 132.1 142.9 92.44% No FP Prod
12/25/92 -0.1 -0.56% 17.6 17.7 18.5 95.68% No FP DEV
1/22/93 20.2 33.06% 81.3 61.1 67.7 90.25% Yes CP DEV
1/25/93 0.3 0.18% 165 164.7 171.4 96.09% No CP Prod
1/25/93 -2.9 -1.19% 240.8 243.7 280.7 86.82% No Mix Prod
1/25/93 -0.1 -0.04% 222.6 222.7 236.3 94.24% No Mix Prod
1/25/93 -12.2 -3.77% 311.5 323.7 349.2 92.70% No Mix Prod
1/25/93 -13.3 -8.12% 150.5 163.8 171.5 95.51% No FP Prod
1/25/93 5.7 4.32% 137.7 132 137 96.35% No FP Prod
1/25/93 19.7 16.69% 137.7 118 90.3 130.68% Yes CP DEV
2/25/93 22.2 24.05% 114.5 92.3 93 99.25% No FP DEV
2/25/93 3.6 3.85% 97.2 93.6 98.9 94.64% No FP Prod
2/25/93 3.5 3.38% 106.9 103.4 108.3 95.48% No FP Prod  
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2/25/93 5.8 3.68% 163.5 157.7 167.9 93.92% No FP
3/25/93 1.2 2.20% 55.8 54.6 57.6 94.79% No CP DEV
3/25/93 23.3 25.55% 114.5 91.2 95 96.00% No FP Prod
3/25/93 44.2 19.91% 266.2 222 232.4 95.52% Yes FP Prod
3/25/93 42.5 8.13% 565.5 523 296 176.69% Yes FP Prod
3/25/93 -5.8 -5.05% 109 114.8 120.8 95.03% No FP Prod
3/25/93 -4.4 -12.83% 29.9 34.3 34.3 100.00% No FP Prod
4/25/93 4.6 6.63% 74 69.4 72.3 95.99% No CP DEV
4/25/93 12.5 3.10% 416 403.5 442.7 91.15% No FP Prod
5/25/93 26.9 70.05% 65.3 38.4 38.4 100.00% No CP DEV
5/25/93 117.8 145.07% 199 81.2 84 96.67% No FP Prod
5/25/93 21.9 11.26% 216.4 194.5 199.8 97.35% No FP Prod
5/25/93 -7.8 -5.83% 126.1 133.9 141.6 94.56% No FP Prod
6/25/93 10.7 18.23% 69.4 58.7 61.6 95.29% No FP Prod
6/25/93 144.1 20.03% 863.6 719.5 722.8 99.54% No FP Prod
6/25/93 -2.4 -3.15% 73.8 76.2 81.3 93.73% No FP Prod
6/25/93 -7.3 -22.96% 24.5 31.8 32.8 96.95% No FP Prod
7/25/93 19.3 2.45% 808.2 788.9 796.7 99.02% No CP Prod
8/25/93 50.6 22.84% 272.1 221.5 194.1 114.12% Yes FP Prod
8/25/93 32.5 5.19% 658.5 626 731 85.64% No FP Prod
8/25/93 -58.1 -11.33% 454.7 512.8 540 94.96% No FP Prod
9/17/93 46.6 21.45% 263.9 217.3 271 80.18% No FP
9/25/93 -1.3 -0.74% 173.2 174.5 219.1 79.64% No CP Prod
10/25/93 -2 -0.85% 234.2 236.2 208.6 113.23% Yes Mix Prod
10/25/93 75 5.36% 1475.2 1400.2 1061.3 131.93% Yes FP Prod
10/25/93 -8.9 -1.44% 609.9 618.8 610.7 101.33% Yes FP Prod
11/25/93 -0.1 -0.06% 168.9 169 119.3 141.66% Yes CP DEV
12/25/93 23.8 5.19% 482.2 458.4 290.3 157.91% Yes FP Prod
1/25/94 -2 -2.46% 79.3 81.3 40.7 199.75% Yes FP DEV
1/25/94 1.4 1.30% 109.4 108 108.8 99.26% Yes FP Prod
1/25/94 6.7 3.86% 180.1 173.4 200.1 86.66% No FP
3/25/94 55.7 66.87% 139 83.3 83.8 99.40% No FP Prod
4/25/94 2.7 0.27% 1004 1001.3 1019.4 98.22% No CP Prod
4/25/94 64.9 14.59% 509.8 444.9 368.5 120.73% Yes FP Prod
4/25/94 4.6 4.53% 106.2 101.6 106.2 95.67% No FP Prod
5/25/94 2.9 15.76% 21.3 18.4 14.7 125.17% Yes CP DEV
5/25/94 0.9 0.08% 1088.5 1087.6 873.9 124.45% Yes FP DEV
7/25/94 12.5 17.34% 84.6 72.1 76.5 94.25% No CP DEV
7/25/94 309.2 27.33% 1440.6 1131.4 1158.4 97.67% Yes FP Prod
7/25/94 104.6 13.14% 900.9 796.3 998.8 79.73% No FP Prod
7/25/94 27.6 4.54% 635.1 607.5 787 77.19% Yes FP Prod
8/25/94 11.9 18.28% 77 65.1 49 132.86% Yes FP Prod
8/25/94 -11.7 -3.88% 289.9 301.6 309.3 97.51% No FP Prod
8/25/94 -13.4 -8.60% 142.4 155.8 163.8 95.12% No FP Prod
8/25/94 76.5 11.86% 721.6 645.1 551.3 117.01% Yes FP Prod
9/25/94 -7 -5.75% 114.8 121.8 134 90.90% No CP Prod
9/25/94 -1.7 -1.53% 109.6 111.3 114.8 96.95% No FP Prod
10/25/94 188.7 19.69% 1147 958.3 897.3 106.80% Yes FP Prod
10/25/94 85.5 9.51% 984.5 899 945.3 95.10% No FP Prod
10/25/94 36.5 12.47% 329.1 292.6 248.9 117.56% Yes FP Prod  
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11/25/94 20.1 4.48% 468.7 448.6 199.6 224.75% Yes CP DEV
11/25/94 -1 -0.44% 224.4 225.4 215.1 104.79% Yes CP DEV
11/25/94 -25.8 -5.52% 441.7 467.5 491 95.21% Yes FP Prod
12/25/94 6.7 2.88% 239.6 232.9 238.8 97.53% No FP Prod
12/25/94 36.5 5.02% 764 727.5 756.1 96.22% No FP Prod
12/25/94 88.1 16.01% 638.5 550.4 611.6 89.99% No FP Prod
12/25/94 16 10.70% 165.5 149.5 180.8 82.69% No FP Prod
12/25/94 106.4 7.75% 1478.5 1372.1 1447.7 94.78% No FP Prod
12/25/94 127.6 14.73% 993.6 866 881 98.30% No FP Prod
1/25/95 5.2 0.49% 1067.7 1062.5 1095.3 97.01% No Yes CP Prod
2/25/95 -2.5 -3.20% 75.7 78.2 86.1 90.82% No Yes CP DEV
2/25/95 41.7 5.39% 816 774.3 853.8 90.69% No Yes FP Prod
3/25/95 1.7 3.46% 50.9 49.2 44.6 110.31% Yes Yes CP DEV
3/25/95 1.2 1.31% 93.1 91.9 117.3 78.35% No Yes FP Prod
3/25/95 51.5 11.47% 500.4 448.9 287.8 155.98% Yes Yes FP Prod
4/25/95 -3.1 -15.90% 16.4 19.5 19.5 100.00% No Yes CP Mix
4/25/95 5.7 3.53% 167.1 161.4 165.7 97.40% No Yes FP Mix
4/25/95 22.3 8.23% 293.1 270.8 228 118.77% Yes Yes FP Prod
5/25/95 2.7 0.96% 282.5 279.8 285.2 98.11% No Yes CP DEV
6/25/95 27.2 37.94% 98.9 71.7 72.8 98.49% No Yes Mix DEV
6/25/95 194.6 40.70% 672.7 478.1 485.5 98.48% No Yes CP DEV
7/25/95 30.3 2.21% 1400.9 1370.6 1406.1 97.48% No Yes FP Prod
7/25/95 0.3 0.29% 102.2 101.9 102.7 99.22% No Yes FP Prod
8/25/95 11.8 10.63% 122.8 111 65.8 168.69% Yes Yes FP Prod
8/25/95 11.4 19.16% 70.9 59.5 66.6 89.34% No Yes FP Prod
8/25/95 17.7 10.66% 183.8 166.1 127.7 130.07% Yes Yes CP DEV
8/25/95 1.9 2.07% 93.7 91.8 93.8 97.87% No Yes CP DEV
9/25/95 1.8 3.74% 49.9 48.1 34.3 140.23% Yes Yes CP DEV
9/25/95 -0.1 -0.35% 28.7 28.8 29 99.31% No Yes CP DEV
9/25/95 8.2 2.43% 345.4 337.2 373.1 90.38% No Yes CP Operations
9/25/95 2.7 1.09% 250.6 247.9 264.6 93.69% No Yes FP Prod
10/25/95 114.1 30.28% 490.9 376.8 386.3 97.54% No Yes CP DEV
10/25/95 29.1 10.28% 312.3 283.2 236.4 119.80% Yes Yes FP Prod
10/25/95 0.7 3.18% 22.7 22 24.2 90.91% No Yes CP Dev
10/25/95 -7.9 -9.23% 77.7 85.6 89.3 95.86% No Yes CP Dev
11/25/95 -4.4 -3.83% 110.6 115 116.1 99.05% No Yes Mix Prod
11/25/95 -36 -7.04% 475.2 511.2 526.8 97.04% No Yes FP Prod
11/25/95 -2.6 -1.82% 140.3 142.9 155.9 91.66% No Yes CP
12/25/95 72.6 46.60% 228.4 155.8 157.8 98.73% No Yes FP DEV
1/25/96 2972.4 57.36% 8154.7 5182.3 5547.9 93.41% No Yes FP DEV
2/25/96 26.1 31.11% 110 83.9 89 94.27% No Yes CP DEV
3/25/96 7.5 12.93% 65.5 58 57.6 100.69% Yes Yes FP Prod
4/25/96 12.1 10.82% 123.9 111.8 118.9 94.03% No Yes CP DEV
4/25/96 -11.5 -1.80% 628.5 640 659.5 97.04% No Yes CP Prod
4/25/96 52.1 8.86% 640.1 588 632 93.04% No Yes Mix Prod
4/25/96 33 35.68% 125.5 92.5 95.8 96.56% No Yes Mix Dev
5/25/96 0.7 0.17% 418.5 417.8 424.1 98.51% No Yes CP DEV
5/25/96 -83.3 -7.10% 1089.4 1172.7 1099.8 106.63% Yes Yes FP Prod
5/25/96 42.5 4.39% 1009.6 967.1 965.9 100.12% Yes Yes FP Prod
6/25/96 35.5 3.28% 1118.6 1083.1 953 113.65% Yes Yes FP DEV  
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6/25/96 -0.4 -0.70% 56.8 57.2 58.3 98.11% No Yes CP Prod
6/25/96 -4.5 -0.84% 531.1 535.6 563 95.13% No Yes FP Prod
6/25/96 -1.2 -2.88% 40.4 41.6 43.8 94.98% No Yes CP Training
7/25/96 1.3 7.93% 17.7 16.4 17.1 95.91% No Yes Mix DEV
7/25/96 -3.7 -0.27% 1382.7 1386.4 1421.2 97.55% No Yes FP Prod
7/25/96 474.6 5.12% 9751.9 9277.3 10514.3 88.24% No Yes FP Mix
8/25/96 13.9 1.96% 722.8 708.9 735.3 96.41% Yes Yes CP DEV
8/25/96 -5.3 -7.91% 61.7 67 67.6 99.11% No Yes FP Prod
8/25/96 4 3.26% 126.8 122.8 162 75.80% No Yes CP
9/25/96 0 0.00% 60.9 60.9 68.5 88.91% No Yes CP DEV
10/25/96 5 5.39% 97.7 92.7 97.6 94.98% No Yes CP DEV
10/25/96 -0.6 -0.81% 73.7 74.3 76.2 97.51% No NO CP DEV
10/25/96 0.2 0.26% 77.1 76.9 77.2 99.61% No NO CP Dev
11/25/96 10.5 11.39% 102.7 92.2 92 100.22% No Yes Mix
11/25/96 -63.5 -3.18% 1936.4 1999.9 1911 104.65% Yes Yes FP Prod
12/25/96 3.5 15.98% 25.4 21.9 21.9 100.00% No Yes CP DEM/VAL
12/25/96 3.4 14.05% 27.6 24.2 24.1 100.41% No Yes CP DEM/VAL
12/25/96 56 0.28% 19765.1 19709.1 10014.8 196.80% Yes Yes CP DEV
12/25/96 -67 -0.61% 10895.7 10962.7 11779.5 93.07% Yes Yes FP Prod
12/25/96 2.6 5.86% 47 44.4 47 94.47% No Yes
1/25/97 11.9 9.88% 132.3 120.4 127.8 94.21% No Yes CP DEV
2/25/97 8.1 7.26% 119.6 111.5 104.6 106.60% Yes Yes FP Prod
2/25/97 26.6 18.22% 172.6 146 149.6 97.59% No Yes CP DEV
2/25/97 13.3 5.88% 239.4 226.1 259.5 87.13% No Yes CP PDRR
2/25/97 69.6 78.82% 157.9 88.3 80.2 110.10% Yes Yes Mix Prod
4/25/97 -3.5 -0.19% 1825.5 1829 1855.6 98.57% No Yes CP DEM/VAL
4/25/97 -5.6 -1.13% 488.9 494.5 520.6 94.99% No Yes CP Prod
5/25/97 15.7 8.54% 199.6 183.9 189.3 97.15% No Yes FP Prod
5/25/97 -31.9 -6.70% 444.4 476.3 512.7 92.90% No Yes FP Prod
5/25/97 1 0.13% 767.8 766.8 706.2 108.58% Yes Yes FP Prod
6/25/97 12.8 11.55% 123.6 110.8 122.5 90.45% No Yes FP DEV
7/25/97 87.6 15.61% 648.6 561 561 100.00% No Yes FP Prod
7/25/97 26.1 8.67% 327.1 301 329.1 91.46% No Yes FP Prod
8/25/97 -3.1 -4.47% 66.3 69.4 70 99.14% No Yes CP Mix
8/25/97 0.8 2.05% 39.9 39.1 39.3 99.49% No Yes CP Mix
8/25/97 -19.6 -18.63% 85.6 105.2 109.8 95.81% No Yes CP Dev
8/25/97 -3.8 -4.09% 89.2 93 94.8 98.10% No NO FP Prod
8/26/97 9.9 5.26% 198.1 188.2 202 93.17% No Yes Prod
9/25/97 145.6 39.00% 518.9 373.3 382.1 97.70% No Yes CP PDRR
9/25/97 225.5 20.11% 1346.6 1121.1 1060.4 105.72% Yes Yes FP Prod
10/25/97 -1 -1.22% 81.1 82.1 98.3 83.52% No NO CP Closure
10/25/97 3.9 2.20% 180.8 176.9 228.3 77.49% No Yes Mix Prod
10/25/97 -57.4 -11.92% 424 481.4 500.6 96.16% No Yes CP Mix
11/25/97 49.7 19.66% 302.5 252.8 255.6 98.90% No Yes FP DEV
11/25/97 1 1.22% 83.1 82.1 85.9 95.58% No Yes FP DEV
11/25/97 2.7 1.84% 149.7 147 157 93.63% No NO Mix Prod
11/25/97 13 57.02% 35.8 22.8 26.3 86.69% No NO CP Prod
12/25/97 9.6 1.24% 786.4 776.8 676.5 114.83% Yes Yes FP Prod
1/25/98 -0.1 -0.34% 29.4 29.5 29.6 99.66% No NO CP DEV
1/25/98 181.3 28.47% 818.2 636.9 632.9 100.63% Yes Yes FP Prod  
   
108 
2/25/98 -0.9 -2.72% 32.2 33.1 41.7 79.38% No Yes CP DEV
3/25/98 18.3 30.65% 78 59.7 60.9 98.03% Yes Yes CP DEV
3/25/98 20.2 17.26% 137.2 117 120.2 97.34% No Yes CP DEV
4/25/98 6.9 4.04% 177.5 170.6 219.2 77.83% No Yes CP Prod
4/25/98 -19.6 -5.71% 323.5 343.1 382.2 89.77% No Yes CP Prod
5/25/98 2.4 5.17% 48.8 46.4 46.5 99.78% No Yes CP DEV
5/25/98 9.5 4.78% 208.2 198.7 233.9 84.95% Yes Yes CP DEV
5/25/98 6.8 3.91% 180.7 173.9 219.3 79.30% No Yes CP
7/25/98 7.4 13.03% 64.2 56.8 76.1 74.64% No Yes CP DEV
7/25/98 25.1 5.96% 446.5 421.4 442.8 95.17% No Yes CP DEV
7/25/98 8.2 14.94% 63.1 54.9 55.5 98.92% No Yes CP DEV
8/25/98 -0.2 -2.13% 9.2 9.4 10.9 86.24% No NO Mix Prod
8/25/98 -3.3 -0.61% 534.9 538.2 552.4 97.43% No Yes FP Prod
9/25/98 6 9.71% 67.8 61.8 65.1 94.93% No Yes Mix DEV
9/25/98 0.9 0.92% 99.2 98.3 113.7 86.46% No Yes CP DEV
9/25/98 -7.3 -3.50% 201.5 208.8 223.8 93.30% No NO CP Planning
9/25/98 109.3 13.50% 919 809.7 843.9 95.95% Yes Yes FP Prod
10/25/98 112 3.55% 3267.6 3155.6 3188.5 98.97% No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 65.1 12.27% 595.7 530.6 534.5 99.27% No Yes CP DEV
11/25/98 4.1 0.83% 498.1 494 421.9 117.09% Yes Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 -5.7 -2.57% 215.8 221.5 243 91.15% No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 0.6 0.46% 131.9 131.3 129.4 101.47% No NO FP Prod
11/25/98 22.3 9.20% 264.8 242.5 246.8 98.26% No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 11.9 9.57% 136.3 124.4 131.5 94.60% No Yes FP Prod
11/25/98 -6.3 -2.45% 250.5 256.8 283.7 90.52% No Yes FP Prod  
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